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The health and wellbeing of our community is based on a mutual 
understanding that we are in this together - whether the audience is our 
customers, the physicians who provide care, our agent and brokers, or the 
alliance partners with whom we collaborate to provide practical, caring 
solutions. With them we share competencies, capabilities and knowledge 
for mutual wins. 
We are committed to achieving shared value through trusted relationships. 
BlueCross BlueShield of Florida 
An Independent Licensee ol the 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida 
P.O. Box 1798 
Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0014 
The health and well-being of our community is based on a mutual understanding that 
we are in this together - whether the audience is our customers, the physicians who 
provide care, our agent and brokers, or the alliance partners with whom we collaborate 
to provide practical, caring solutions. With them we share competencies, capabilities 
and knowledge for mutual wins. 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida's (BCBSF's) Alliance Management program puts 
solid alliance business practices and disciplines into action to achieve shared value 
through trusted relationships. 
Both our partners and colleagues are empowered with the tools and backing to make the 
most out of partnerships. Combining this intellectual capital with a focus on results 
yields powerful relationships that deliver value to all involved parties. 
Our existing alliances received seven national awards and two regional awards for 
innovation, partnering capabilities and solutions. In addition, 
• 100% of alliance partners from organizations outside of BCBSF agree or strongly 
agree that Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida is a desirable partner of choice. Of 
these respondents, 85% strongly agree with the statement. 
• Eight alliances reported against annual revenues with a positive impact of $.'359 
million in 2004. 
• Two alliances tracking financial conservation - savings achieved by delivering a 
business process and/ or service through an alliance relationship-reported savings of 
more than $6 million in 2004. 
• BCBSF recently was honored with the 2005 Overall Management Excellence Award 
presented by the Association of Strategic Alliance Professionals (ASAP) at its 7th 
Global Alliance Summit. 
We've enclosed a sample of articles, which also speak to our work in the practice of 
Alliance Management. We're proud of the work that we've accomplished and we are 
excited about the work we have ahead. 
To find out more about what you read we invite you to contact us so that we can discuss 
the material in person. In the meantime, find out what the Gartner Group, Harvard 
Business Review and the Academy of Management Executive say about our work. 
These and others are included in the material we've enclosed. 
Renee Finley 
Enterprise Alliance Management Group 
Alliance Management Produces More 
Successful Outcomes 
GartnerG2 Case Study TS-CAS-0904-0004, September 2004 
Situation 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. (BCBSF) 
provides health benefit plans and health-related 
services to its members. The company and its 
subsidiaries serve more than 6 million Floridians. 
However, maintaining a market leadership position is 
difficult in light of the many challenges facing today's 
healthcare marketplace. Rising healthcare costs, 
increased competition, legislation, consumerism and 
shifting demographics sent the company searching 
for new and different ways of doing business, as 
customers' healthcare needs and expectations 
expand. 
Developing alliances is one way the company is 
positioning itself for the future. Currently, BCBSF has 
approximately 40 alliance relationships, which are 
defined as a collaborative relationship between 
entities that share the risk and reward of pursuing 
mutually compatible goals that are difficult to achieve 
alone. 
Alliances may include outsourcing partnerships, joint 
operating agreements or joint ventures. These 
relationships provide BCBSF and its partners access 
to new markets, capabilities, knowledge and capital, 
along with the ability to share development and 
acquisition costs and risks. Alliances also help each 
partner bring products or services to market quickly 
in a cost-effective manner, which is critical in today's 
healthcare industry. 
However, successful alliances - those that meet 
stated business objectives and return targets - are 
difficult to achieve. The majority of alliances fail to 
meet expectations for two significant reasons: 
• Shifts in internal business strategies. 
• A lack of senior management focus. 
Organizations considering alliances and those 
already involved in alliances benefit from a 
programmed, disciplined approach to alliance 
Issue/Solution 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. (BCBSF) 
wanted to maximize the effectiveness of multiple, 
dynamic alliances. 
By developing a methodical approach to forming and 
managing alliances, it increased the likelihood of meet­
ing business goals. 
Situation 
• Rising healthcare costs, increased competition, leg­
islation and consumerism demand new and different 
ways of doing business. 
• Developing alliances with other organizations is one 
way BCBSF is positioning itself for the health indus­
try of the future. 
• Alliances that meet business objective targets are 
difficult to achieve and sustain without a pro­
grammed, disciplined approach. 
Discoveries 
• Before the Enterprise Alliance Management Initiative, 
BCBSF's alliances had varying styles and operating 
philosophies. 
• Benchmarking research helped BCBSF cultivate 
best practices and incorporate them into a cus­
tomized alliance program. 
• Measuring alliance performance allows BCBSF to 
achieve desired outcomes, monitor progress, and 
recognize and reward success. 
Recommendations 
• Create a dedicated team specializing in the disci­
pline of alliance management to help successfully 
manage alliances. 
• Develop a well-rounded program with a variety of 
user-friendly options for learning about alliance man­
agement. 
• Designate an individual for each alliance whose role 
explicitly includes alliance management, and meas­
ure performance. 
Dig Deeper 
• Related Research from GartnerG2 
• Gartner Core Research 
• Outside Sources 
• Methodology 
GartnerlG2 
management. Developing an alliance capability 
includes equipping the organization with the skills 
and tools to maximize success, learning about 
alliance management and leveraging knowledge 
within the company. BCBSF increased success rates 
by investing in alliance training, alliance specialists 
and alliance evaluation. 
BCBSF established an Enterprise Alliance 
Management Initiative to institutionalize its alliance 
capability. The initiative included the formation in 
2001 of the Enterprise Alliance Management Group 
to help BCBSF's business sectors develop strategic 
relationships with other entities through a 
programmed, disciplined approach. This approach 
enables the company's business areas to 
successfully form, manage and transform alliances. 
It also makes it possible for the company to assess 
the performance of its entire alliance portfolio. 
BCBSF found that essential components of 
successful alliances include a defined approach to 
performance management that begins with strategic 
planning and alignment, and must also include 
annual goals and performance metrics specific to the 
alliance. 
Discoveries 
Before establishing the Enterprise Alliance 
Management Initiative, BCBSF had several alliances 
with varying management styles and operating 
philosophies. Business units within the company 
responsible for managing alliances did not employ a 
consistent approach for developing and managing 
these relationships. In light of the estimated failure 
rate of alliances, the company realized it could 
maximize the effectiveness of its alliances by 
providing business units with standardized 
methodologies, tools and resources. The Enterprise 
Alliance Management Group was formed to provide 
those tools and resources. 
Creating guidelines and a framework 
The first step was to create an alliance management 
framework and engagement guidelines for evaluating 
all business arrangements with external partners. A 
decision-making tool was developed to guide 
individuals and groups through the process of 
determining whether it is best to build, buy or ally. 
The tool features evaluation criteria and a decision 
matrix that can be used to analyze the best option. 
BCBSF divides its capabilities into three categories: 
core assets, mission-critical activities and non-core 
assets. Non-core assets are generally considered 
most suitable for outsourcing partnerships. Mission­
critical activities are considered for alliances only 
after thorough deliberation on whether to build, buy or 
ally. Core assets are not usually considered for 
alliances. 
If an alliance is the best option for an opportunity or 
capability, BCBSF follows an alliance framework, 
which contains specific activities, tasks and tools for 
each stage of alliance management (see Figure 1 ) .  
Stages include planning, exploring and evaluating, 
negotiating, structuring, managing and, if needed, 
transforming. 
The Enterprise Alliance Management Group provides 
assistance with a variety of tasks, including 
identifying partnering opportunities, selecting 
appropriate partners, facilitating the launch of a new 
alliance, assisting with audit activities, and helping to 
analyze termination or decisions to renegotiate. For 
example, the group offers a tool to facilitate partner 
selection that assesses partners in three dimensions: 
strategic, operational and cultural. 
Moving from theory to action 
Within each alliance, one individual from the 
respective business area has alliance manager 
accountabilities. Responsibilities include overseeing 
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Figure 1: Individual alliance and portfolio framework 
Business strategy Results 













Source: BCBSF and Vantage Partners, September 2004 
the day-to-day management of the relationship and 
championing the alliance's best interests. Alliance 
managers throughout the company get support 
services from the Enterprise Alliance Management 
Program. Services include one-on-one consultations, 
workshops and self-help tools to help manage 
alliances. 
For example, the alliance management portal 
provides access through an internal Web site to a 
variety of tools and consulting information, such as 
training opportunities, links to alliance resources and 
current news about the latest developments in 
alliance management. The site also offers the 
Strategic Alliance Best Practice User Guide, which 
provides step-by-step information to help in forming, 
managing and evolving key business relationships. 
The guide is also available in hard copy. Information 
on the site, like the consulting services, is the result 
of years of experience, analysis of successes and 
failures, and surveys of the most profitable 
approaches used by the country's top alliance 
experts. 
After having researched the alliance market for best 
practices and insights, BCBSF is further refining and 
enhancing its alliance management capabilities by 
working with Vantage Partners. Vantage Partners is a 
consulting firm that specializes in helping companies 
institutionalize the capability to effectively negotiate, 
build and manage critical relationships. 
Soon, users will be able to access a variety of 
alliance reference documents through the alliance 
management portal. The company recognized that 
creating a centralized point of access and storage for 
alliance and partner profiles, as well as key 
documents and performance indicators would 
increase knowledge management across the 
enterprise. BCBSF is also working with Vantage 
Technologies, the software division of Vantage 
Partners, to customize and implement a Web-based 
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capability to capture, store and report alliance 
activities across the various business areas. BCBSF 
is currently piloting six alliances through this 
software, and plans to implement the capability 
throughout the organization by the end of 2004. In 
addition, BCBSF is seeking to expand these 
capabilities to include selective, shared access with 
its alliance partners. 
Another self-help capability and learning resource for 
those managing alliances is the Community of 
Practice. The Community of Practice is an informal 
group of alliance practitioners and key enablers from 
across the organization who work together to 
compare, validate and disseminate alliance 
management best practices. As a result of these 
engagements, participants may harness the 
collective efforts around the organization to help 
deliver greater value from alliances. 
The vision for the Community of Practice is to be a 
self-governed group that meets regularly. Meetings 
include educational sessions and facilitated 
workshops where members work together to 
produce solutions for common issues or 
opportunities. A unique feature of the meetings is 
that they are open to external alliance partners. 
Measuring performance 
One significant advantage of having a formal 
methodology for alliance management is the toolset 
provided to alliance managers for performance 
measurement. Monitoring progress helps in 
recognizing problems early, facilitates problem 
diagnosis and corrective action, and recognizes and 
rewards success. 
The basis for measuring performance begins with a 
business plan defining the market opportunity, 
product or service, sales and promotional approach, 
and financial forecasts. This is critical in setting the 
stage for alignment with corporate goals. In addition, 
4 
each partner should agree early on what it will 
contribute in terms of capital, resources and revenue. 
This business plan provides initial direction in 
performance measurement activities. 
At BCBSF, alliance performance is measured in four 
areas: 
• Alliance performance metrics, which measure 
the targeted results of individual alliances. 
· Enterprise alliance value metrics, which 
demonstrate the degree to which each alliance 
adds value (high, medium or low) to each of the 
company's seven corporate objectives. These 
were created to help the company determine if 
and how alliances are contributing to the overall 
success of the enterprise. 
• Alliance management program effectiveness, 
which allows internal stakeholders and alliance 
partners to measure the effectiveness of the 
company's alliance program. In effect, this 
measures customer satisfaction. It is an extremely 
helpful tool for engaging alliance managers more 
directly in the program by allowing them to rate 
current services and provide input on the 
program's future direction. Through online, oral 
and written surveys, the Enterprise Alliance 
Management Group uses feedback from alliance 
managers and other key stakeholders to enhance 
and fine-tune the program. It also helps assess 
the company's progress toward developing 
alliance capabilities. 
· Array of enterprise alliances, which measures 
the success and health of the alliances as a 
collection overall. Successful alliance 
management is not only a function of individual 
alliances, but also involves effective design and 
management of a company's entire set of 







































measurement, the company is moving toward 
looking at all of its alliances as an aggregated 
whole. This helps the company determine 
synergies among organizations, and identify and 
reduce constraints among alliances. It also helps 
identify opportunities for balancing the array of 
business relationships so it is not overly 
concentrated on one type of alliance or one sub­
market of the health industry. 
management. Relationship deterioration is a leading 
cause of alliance failure, so measuring the health of 
the alliance relationship is critical. However, strength 
in all three areas is necessary for an alliance to 
reach its full potential. Each metric is compared as a 
percentage of the goal, so all partners can easily see 
which areas need improvement. 
Of the four areas, alliance performance metrics is 
the most mature. Members of the Enterprise Alliance 
Management Group work with alliance managers to 
develop customized scorecards that provide a 
variety of metrics on the performance of each 
alliance. Metrics are unique to each alliance and are 
derived through collaboration with alliance partners 
to define shared goals and expected outcomes. 
Three areas are scored: strategic growth potential, 
operational performance and relationship 
Table 1: Performance metrics for alliances 
Strategic Growth 
For example, two alliances the Enterprise Alliance 
Management Program supports have resulted in 
year-to-date (January through July 2004) capital 
conservation of approximately $6 million. The 
Enterprise Alliance Management Group facilitated a 
workshop for BCBSF representatives and 
representatives from the alliance partner to jointly 
develop performance metrics. Through these 
performance metrics, the alliance identified areas to 
strengthen value delivery and initiated corrective 
actions (see Table 1 ). 
• Financial return from alliance (revenue, profit, capital conservation, unit cost reduction) 
• Number of new customers 
• Number of cross-sell customers 
• Number of new markets accessed 
• Number of new capabilities, products or services deployed in marketplace 
• Number of new solutions deployed in marketplace 
Operational 
• Alliance use of new physical assets and intellectual property 
• New contacts and relationships established through partnerships 
• Business process improvements learned from partner 
• Performance improvements gained through alliances (reduced error rates, development 
time, lead conversion to sales rate, average length of sales cycle) 
• Enhanced capacity and scalability 
Relationship 
• Health and quality of relationship (quality of communications, decision-making, conflict 
resolution, mutual gains negotiation, joint problem-solving, level of trust) 
• Alignment to strategic vision 
• Level of senior management support 
Source: BCBSF and Vantage Partners, September 2004 
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• Establish vision • Benchmark external 
for BCBSF as an "best practices." 
alliance partner • Establish standard of choice. alliance formation 
• Gain executive and management 
alignment to vision. framework and 
toolkit. • Determine strategy 
for achieving vision. 
• Establish dedicated 
Enterprise Alliance 
Management Group. 
Source: BCBSF and Vantage Partners, September 2004 
Implementation timeline 
Creating a structure that will facilitate the 
development of successful alliances takes time and 
committed resources. Figure 2 shows the timeline for 
establishing the enterprise alliance management 
program at BCBSF. 
Recommendations 
· Create a dedicated team specializing in the 
discipline of alliance management. Any firm 
whose growth strategy includes alliances needs to 
have positions committed to create and maintain 
an alliance management program. The team does 
not need to be large, but must be structured in a 
way that helps others throughout the organization 
successfully manage alliances. It is impractical for 
most organizations to fund large departments of 
alliance specialists. However, by creating a small, 
dedicated team that teaches others the discipline 
of alliances through consulting and self-help tools, 
the capability for successful alliance management 
can be instituted throughout an organization in a 
cost-effective way. This will allow others in the 
organization to develop the competencies they 
need to manage alliances successfully. BCBSF 
has committed funds for dedicated resources in 
the Enterprise Alliance Management Group, 
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• Integrate relationship 
management 
activities and tools 
into alliance 
framework. 
• Initiate training and 
consulting. 





• Enhance and add 
to toolset. 
• Develop enterprise 
alliance portfolio 
governance. 
• Establish Community 
of Practice. 
• Regularly conduct 
assessments of 
alliances and alliance 
capabilities. 
consultants, alliance practitioners within the 
business areas and training. The Enterprise 
Alliance Management Group periodically engages 
staff internal to BCBSF as well as external subject 
matter experts for supplemental support, external 
perspectives and co-development of capabilities. 
• Develop a well-rounded program with a variety 
of user-friendly options for learning about 
alliance management. This includes self-help 
tools, face-to-face consulting and workshops. 
Training materials, tools and information should be 
designed in a way that will allow others to develop 
alliance management capabilities of their own. 
Provide opportunities to learn from other internal 
and external alliance practitioners. Make sure 
information is easily accessible, practical, easy to 
understand and use, and offered in a range of 
media. Individual tools can be used in isolation, 
but using complementary components delivers the 
greatest value. Offering a variety of tools through 
various media helps alliance managers with 
diverse learning styles develop competencies to 
manage alliances successfully. In addition, when 
alliance partners share tools with each o!her, it 
facilitates understanding, communications and 




























Cross Blue Shield plans and with their alliance 
partners. 
· Designate an individual for each alliance 
whose role explicitly includes alliance 
management. Each alliance should have an 
alliance manager responsible for keeping the best 
interests of the alliance in the forefront. This 
person is responsible for the day-to-day 
management of the relationship and championing 
the best interests of the alliance. This doesn't 
necessarily need to be a dedicated position, but 
alliance management should be part of an explicit 
item in the individual's job description. 
· Measure performance. It is important to evaluate 
the performance of each alliance in a collaborative 
manner with input from all alliance partners and 
other key stakeholders. Partners should take an 
active role in developing performance metrics, a 
relationship scorecard and assessing progress 
toward goals. 
· Lead the change. It is not enough simply to 
create a dedicated team for alliance management. 
The team must be a proactive proponent for 
change throughout the organization. That is 
necessary for building an environment and 
business processes in which alliances can 
succeed. The alliance program requires strong 
senior leadership commitment and support in 
championing alliances and the alliance 
management discipline. Traditional "turf-protection" 
mindsets can destroy an alliance, if allowed to 
continue. Alliances work best when each partner 
works to understand the other's underlying 
interests. The alliance program must be proactive 
and deliberate in establishing collaborative 
behaviors among alliance practitioners. 
- Work to modify traditional recognition and 
reward systems so they recognize alliance 
success. 
- Establish relationship management training and 
tools that are focused on mutual gains 
negotiations, managing conflict, dealing with 
difficult conversations, and understanding 
others' interests and perspectives. 
Incorporate "build, buy or ally" options into 
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Summary: Having the right partners-and the right 
partnering practices-commands the attention of IT 
alliance builders. Industry standards are emerging. 
Outside Sources 
BCBSF Web site (http://www.bcbsfl.com/) 
Vantage Partners Web site 
(http://www.vantagepartners.com) 
Methodology 
Information for this case study is derived from 
detailed GartnerG2 discussions with senior managers 
of BCBSF: Bridget Booth, principal in the Enterprise 
Alliance Management Group; Matt Mccredie, 
Enterprise Alliance Management consultant; and 
Renee Finley, principal in the Enterprise Alliance 
Management Group. Background information and 
insights are drawn from the industry knowledge and 
experience of the authors. 
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10 Healthcare Predictions For 2005 
by Elizabeth W. Boehm 
with Bradford J. Holmes, Lynne"Sam"Bishop, Eric G. Brown, Katy Henrickson, and Laura Ramos 
Healthcare IT has moved off the back burner as healthcare organizations respond to rising demands 
around runaway costs, uncertain quality, and opaque value from every constituent they serve. Here are 
Forrester's top predictions of what healthcare companies and the vendors that support them will do and 
experience in 2005 in response to markets pressing for progress. 
HE T Tr 
Healthcare was hot in 2004 with the rollout of the Medicare reform legislation, the appointment 
of a national healthcare IT coordinator, M&A activity in the health plan sector, the high-profile 
withdrawal of a major pharmaceutical blockbuster, and consumer-driven insurance products stoking 
the fire. What changes does 2005 hold for healthcare organizations and the technologies they deploy? 
Forrester predicts that: 
1. Pay-for-performance (P4P) will take off in health plan network contracts. In an effort to 
spread evidence-based clinical best practices and control medical costs, pioneering health plans 
have instituted P4P programs to reward hospitals that score well on negotiated quality measures. 
According to The Leapfrog Group's Incentive & Reward Compendium, there are approximately 
20 financial incentive programs in place between health plans and hospitals today - out of 
approximately 350 commercial health plans in the US. Why not more? Hospitals and plans don't 
see eye-to-eye on which quality measures to use. But as the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services' ( CMS') National Voluntary Hospital Reporting Initiative (NVHRI) gains momentum, 
hospitals will be more willing to report these standard quality measures, and plans will use the 
data to kick-start P4P negotiations. Forrester expects the number of plans with hospital P4P 
programs to more than double in 2005. 
2. Blues plans will pool their IT ventures. In the aftermath of eHealth's go-go years, survivors 
Availity, NaviMedix, and RealMed - all heavily backed by Blue Cross Blue Shield plans - are 
enjoying regional success providing c9nnectivity between care providers and Blues plans. To 
grow these ventures beyond their captive Blues clients and into the larger national market, 
Forrester expects their patrons - plans like Highmark BCBS, BCBS of Florida, and Health Care 
Service Corporation (HCSC) - to explore ways to roll the products together. By year's end, look 
for the creation of an arm's-length subsidiary, akin to UnitedHealthcare's Ingenix, jointly owned 
by Blues plans and ready to sell provider portal services to insurers of any color. 
Trends Forrester's Top 1 0  Healthcare Predictions For 2005 
3. Despite FDA coaxing, lack of ROI will stifle RFID drug pedigree progress. Pushing 
to secure the US prescription drug supply chain, the FDA cleared the way in November 
for radio frequency identification (RFID) as the key technology for antitheft and anti­
counterfeit pilots. While GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, and Purdue 
Pharma threw their hats in the ring, Forrester predicts that the cost and immaturity 
of this nascent technology will limit activity to small-scale experimentation only. 
Expect no more than half a dozen major pilots in 2005 - none of the size that would 
test RFID effectiveness across the entire product portfolio - as most top-SO pharma 
firms watch from the sidelines and wait for a solid business case to surface. Barring a 
high-profile drug safety scare (think Tylenol in the '80s), the FDA working group's only 
influence in 2005 will come from sustaining a PR campaign promoting RFID for drug 
safety and - more subtly - discouraging reimportation. 
4. Medicare drug discount cards won't entice 80% of eligible seniors. The first phase 
of the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 provides Medicare-eligible 
consumers access to discount drug card memberships. The program, a stopgap until the 
full prescription benefit takes effect in 2006, has attracted only 5.8 million enrollees out 
of a total eligible population of about 4 1  million - and nearly half of current discount 
card holders were automatically enrolled by their supplemental insurance carrier. 1 The 
majority of US seniors still struggle to differentiate dozens of competing card programs 
- each with varying discount levels, covered drugs, and pharmacy networks. Forrester 
expects that card vendors will continue to miss the mark with seniors, meaning that 
Medicare discount card enrollment will creep to slightly more than 8 million by the 
end of 2005 - a total participation rate of barely 20% of Medicare beneficiaries. 
5. Forty-four percent of online commercial plan members will visit health plan 
sites. In the coming year, large health insurers will continue to drive members toward 
self-service - directing them to the Net for benefits-related content and self-service 
transactions like claims status lookup. Bolstered by this push and their own growing 
online experience, commercially insured consumers will increasingly expect insurers' 
Web sites to provide answers to their plan-related questions. Forrester predicts that 
44% of online health plan members will visit their insurer's site in 2005, up from 34% 
in 2004 - a 30% jump (see Figure 1 ) .  But members won't consistently turn to the Web 
as their first line of service - and consumer-directed health plan (CDHP) enrollment 
won't take off - until 2006, when plans do a better job providing digestible, provider­
quality information, usable online decision support tools, and ready access to financial 
information like deductibles and FSA or HSA balances.2 
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Figure 1 Health P lan Members' S ite Visits Wi l l  I ncrease By 30% From 2004 To 2005 
50% 
40% 
Percent of online plan 30% 
members visiting their 
insurer's Web site 20% 
1 0% 
*Source: Forrester's ConsumerTechnog raphics• 2003 North American Benchmark Study 
tSource: Forrester's Consumer Technograph ics 2004 North American Benchmark Study 
3 
Source: Forrester Research, Inc. 
6. Pharma's eDetailing initiatives will reach a plateau. In response to physicians' 
mounting reluctance to spend valuable office time with drug sales reps, pharma firms 
have sought new, often electronic, means of maintaining their share of voice with top 
prescribers. One of the most successful of these tactics is eDetailing, inviting a target 
group of physicians to participate in an electronic marketing session. Drug firms 
spent 2004 expanding the breadth of their eDetailing initiatives to encompass a greater 
number of the drugs in their portfolio. The result? Top prescribers - particularly 
family practitioners, internists, and ob/gyns - today are inundated with email 
invitations for eDetails. Forrester expects that in 2005, the number of eDetails each 
high prescriber completes will flatten if not decline as the novelty of the medium wears 
off. Does this spell the death of eDetailing vendors like Lathian Systems, Medsite, 
and Physicians Interactive? Not a chance. Vendors will make up for frequency 
shortfalls among high prescribers by increasing their recruiting efforts among midtier 
prescribers and allied health professionals like nurse practitioners, physician assistants, 
and pharmacists. They'll increase their total reach - and charge pharma firms for 
ready access to a larger base of prescribers and influencers. 
7. Philips Medical Systems will expand its clinical IT portfolio. The strategic relationship 
between Philips and Epic Systems, forged at the close of 2003, allows the medical 
imaging vendor to match the "digital hospital" positioning of healthcare interstructure 
competitors GE Healthcare and Siemens Medical Solutions. But consolidation among 
healthcare providers - and their inclusion of previously isolated physician practices 
- is driving Philips' hospital IT competitors to add practice management and electronic 
medical records (EMR) systems for small and midsize physician groups to their 
offerings. While Philips sat idle, GE scooped up Millbrook and MedicaLogic, and Cerner 
recently picked offVitalWorks - a missed opportunity for Philips as the combination 
or st k ar re ,r I t . >'roh1l:: 
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ofVitalWorks' AMICAS medical imaging software and Philips' core apps would have 
greatly boosted the vendor's market clout. The Cerner deal will light a fire under Philips, 
forcing it to move quickly in 2005 before the valuations of targets like A 4 Health Systems, 
Greenway Medical Technologies, NextGen Healthcare Information Systems, and 
Physician Micro Systems are driven up and out of reach by rising physician adoption of 
EMRs - and before Siemens or McKesson get there. 
8. Large banks will acquire debit card vendors to round out their HSA portfolios. 
The Medicare Modernization Act, which enables tax-advantaged health savings accounts 
(HSAs) for consumers in high-deductible plans, prompted large, brand-name banks 
like JPMorgan Chase, Mellon, and Wells Fargo to launch HSA custodial services. To 
make their HSA ventures pay, big banks will need to expand their services mix beyond 
mere asset management to include transaction processing - at least until HSAs gain 
sufficient traction to command a significant asset base. Meanwhile, specialized debit 
card vendors like Cardtronic, Evolution Benefits, MBI, and Motivano, have developed 
tools to tie together HSA transactions across plans, PBMs, and banks. In 2005, 
Forrester expects aggressive HSA bankers like Mellon and JPMorgan Chase to acquire 
HSA debit card upstarts that have established attractive transaction processing services. 
9. Medicare's chronic care improvement projects will woo startups - but not IDNs. 
The Medicare Modernization Act calls for demonstration projects in chronic care 
improvement to begin in 2005. The projects - funded by CMS - will seek to prove 
that disease management services can help patients with congestive heart failure 
(CHF), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD),  and diabetes to adhere to 
evidence-based medicine treatment protocols. The catch for firms that lobby to be 
one of the project's guinea pig vendors? Payment is "contingent on improvements in 
quality:' Although project participation is open to disease management firms, insurers, 
integrated delivery networks (IDNs), and physician group practices, Forrester expects 
that most applications will come from disease management firms like American 
Healthways, CorSolutions, and Health Dialog, as well as from emerging healthcare 
unbound solution providers like CyberNet Medical and HomMed.3 Why? Because 
those "improvements in quality" equate to decreases in services consumed - and those 
service reductions come straight off the top lines of IDNs and physician group practices. 
10 .  Doctors will fall further behind the industry drive toward automation. Doctors 
- particularly those younger than 43 - are not technology laggards individually, 
but the smaller medical practices that dominate the frontlines of healthcare delivery 
in the US are technology backwaters compared with the large payers to which they need 
to connect.4 Today, only about a quarter maintain any part of their medical records 
electronically and are able to track their clinical processes, outcomes, and quality in 
an efficient and reliable way. And resistance to change comes in the most visceral form 
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because money spent on IT by a two-person practice takes bread from the mouths of 
the families that are dependent on these small businesses. What will it take to bring 
about faster physician practice adoption of clinical IT - to reduce errors, improve 
quality, and satisfy plan P4P contracts? Forrester does not expect CMS or private plans 
to offer major funding support across broad market swaths in 2005, but we do foresee 
the stick being applied to recalcitrant doctors in a closed health system or in small 
regional markets. Look for plans in a market like Boston or Minneapolis, or a CMS 
pilot in a location like Phoenix, to raise eyebrows with tough payment penalties - or 
program exclusion - for providers who do not have the data infrastructure needed to 
meet these payers' demands for evidence of value in their care delivery. 
1 Source: The Heritage Foundation, "The Progress Of The Medicare Drug Discount Card;' 
December 1 ,  2004, and the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services Web site: Statistics and Data. 
2 CDHP product share will approach 7% by 2007. The last consumer-friendly innovation to hit 
the health benefits market, point-of-service (POS) plans grew from zero members to 25% of the 
market in about 10 years, with the bulk of the enrollment gains happening in the middle five 
years. CDHP products will follow a similar trajectory. See the July 22, 2003, Brief "Consumer­
Directed Health Plan Leaders Poised For Growth:' 
3 Technologies in, on, and around the body that free care from formal institutions - what 
Forrester calls healthcare unbound - have moved beyond the lab and are vying to enter the 
mass market. Combine baby boomers caring for aging parents, and beginning to face age-related 
conditions themselves, with a growing base of technology and network infrastructure on which 
to build remote healthcare communication, and it seems the ideal moment for massive market 
growth. But healthcare unbound will not provide an immediate or easy win for vendors. The true 
potential of healthcare unbound will not be realized until third-party payers - especially CMS 
- see the evidence they need to justify reimbursing technologies and services that break the mold 
of traditional healthcare payment models. As a result, Forrester projects that healthcare unbound 
will struggle to top $5 billion by 2010, but will skyrocket to $34 billion by 20 15. See the July 8, 2004, 
Forrester Big Idea "Who Pays For Healthcare Unbound:' 
4 Physicians remain more aggressive users of the Internet than other US consumers, with 87% of all 
doctors going online at least monthly. But it's the younger physicians who are leading the charge, 
armed with many more PD As than their older peers and availing themselves of the Internet as a 
tool for general research and a source of specific drug and medical device information. See the 
August 24, 2004, Quick Take "The Next Generation Of Wired Physicians:' 
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The quest for harmony and common goals can actually obstruct 
teamwork. Managers get truly effective collaboration only when they 
realize that conflict is natural and necessary. 
Want Collaboration? 
Accept-and Actively Manage-Conflict 
by Jeff Weiss a nd Jonathan  H ughes 
The challenge i s  a long-standing one for senior 
managers: How do you get people in your or­
ganization to work together across internal 
boundaries? But the question has taken on ur­
gency in today's global and fast-changing busi­
ness environment. To service multinational 
accounts, you increasingly need seamless col­
laboration across geographic boundaries. To 
improve customer satisfaction, you increas­
ingly need collaboration among functions 
ranging from R&D to distribution. To offer so­
lutions tailored to customers' needs, you in­
creasingly need collaboration between prod­
uct and service groups. 
Meanwhile, as competitive pressures contin­
ually force companies to find ways to do more 
with less, few managers have the luxury of re­
lying on their own dedicated staffs to accom­
plish their objectives. Instead, most must work 
with and through people across the organiza­
tion, many of whom have different priorities, 
incentives, and ways of doing things. 
Getting collaboration right promises tre­
mendous benefits: a unified face to customers, 
faster internal decision making, reduced costs 
through shared resources, and the develop­
ment of more innovative products. But despite 
the billions of dollars spent on initiatives to im­
prove collaboration, few companies are happy 
with the results. Time and again we have seen 
management teams employ the same few 
strategies to boost internal cooperation. They 
restructure their organizations and reengineer 
their business processes. They create cross-unit 
incentives. They offer teamwork training. 
While such initiatives yield the occasional suc­
cess story, most of them have only limited im­
pact in dismantling organizational silos and 
fostering collaboration-and many are total 
failures. (See the sidebar "The Three Myths of 
Collaboration:') 
So what's the problem? Most companies re­
spond to the challenge of improving collabora­
tion in entirely the wrong way. They focus on 
the symptoms ("Sales and delivery do not 
work together as closely as they should") 
rather than on the root cause of failures in co­
operation: conflict. The fact is, you can't im-
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prove collaboration until you've addressed the 
issue of conflict. 
This can come as a surprise to even the most 
experienced executives, who generally don't 
fully appreciate the inevitability of conflict in 
complex organizations. And even if they do 
recognize this, many mistakenly assume that 
efforts to increase collaboration will signifi­
cantly reduce that conflict, when in fact some 
of these efforts-for example, restructuring in­
itiatives-actually produce more of it 
Executives underestimate not only the inev­
itability of conflict but also-and this is key­
its importance to the organization. The dis­
agreements sparked by differences in perspec­
tive, competencies, access to information, and 
strategic focus within a company actually gen­
erate much of the value that can come from 
collaboration across organizational bound­
aries. Clashes between parties are the crucibles 
in which creative solutions are developed and 
wise trade-offs among competing objectives 
are made. So instead of trying simply to reduce 
disagreements, senior executives need to em­
brace conflict and, just as important, institu­
tionalize mechanisms for managing it 
Even though most people lack an innate un­
derstanding of how to deal with conflict effec­
tively, there are a number of straightforward 
ways that executives can help their people­
and their organizations-constructively man­
age it These can be divided into two main ar­
eas: strategies for managing disagreements at 
the point of conflict and strategies for manag­
ing conflict upon escalation up the manage­
ment chain. These methods can help a com­
pany move through the conflict that is a 
necessary precursor to truly effective collabo­
ration and, more important, extract the value 
that often lies latent in intra-organizational dif­
ferences. When companies are able to do both, 
conflict is transformed from a major liability 
into a significant asset 
Strategies for Managing 
Disagreements at the Point of 
Conflict 
Conflict management works best when the par­
ties involved in a disagreement are equipped to 
manage it themselves. The aim is to get people 
to resolve issues on their own through a process 
that improves-or at least does not damage­
their relationships. The following strategies 
help produce decisions that are better in-
formed and more likely to be implemented. 
Devise and implement a common method 
for resolving conflict. Consider for a moment 
the hypothetical Matrix Corporation, a com­
posite of many organizations we've worked 
with whose challenges will likely be familiar 
to managers. Over the past few years, sales­
people from nearly a dozen of Matrix's prod­
uct and service groups have been called on to 
design and sell integrated solutions to their 
customers. For any given sale, five or more 
lead salespeople and their teams have to agree 
on issues of resource allocation, solution de­
sign, pricing, and sales strategy. Not surpris­
ingly, the teams are finding this difficult Who 
should contribute the most resources to a par­
ticular customer's offering? Who should re­
duce the scope of their participation or dis­
count their pricing to meet a customer's 
budget? Who should defer when disagree­
ments arise about account strategy? Who 
should manage key relationships within the 
customer account? Indeed, given these thorny 
questions, Matrix is finding that a single large 
sale typically generates far more conflict inside 
the company than it does with the customer. 
The resulting wasted time and damaged rela­
tionships among sales teams are making it in­
creasingly difficult to close sales. 
Most companies face similar sorts of prob­
lems. And, like Matrix, they leave employees 
to find their own ways of resolving them. But 
without a structured method for dealing with 
these issues, people get bogged down not 
only in what the right result should be but 
also in how to arrive at it Often, they will 
avoid or work around conflict, thereby forgo­
ing important opportunities to collaborate. 
And when people do decide to confront their 
differences, they usually default to the ap­
proach they know best debating about who's 
right and who's wrong or haggling over small 
concessions. Among the negative conse­
quences of such approaches are suboptimal, 
"split-the-difference" resolutions-if not out­
right deadlock. 
Establishing a companywide process for re­
solving disagreements can alter this familiar 
scenario. At the very least, a well-defined, well­
designed conflict resolution method will re­
duce transaction costs, such as wasted time and 
the accumulation of ill will, that often come 
with the struggle to work though differences. 
At best, it will yield the innovative outcomes 
























Want Col laboration? 
The Three Myths of Collaboration 
Com pan ies attempt to foster col l aboration a mong d ifferent pa rts of the i r  organ i zations th rough  a variety of methods, many based on 
a n u m ber  of seeming ly sens ib le  but u lti mately misgu ided assum ptions:  
Effective collaboration means 
"teaming?' 
Many com pan ies th ink that teamwork 
tra i n i ng is the way to promote col l abora­
tion across an organization. So they' l l  get 
the H R  department to run hundreds of 
managers and the ir  subord inates th rough 
i ntensive two- or three-day tra in i ng pro­
grams. Workshops w i l l  offer techn iques for 
getting g roups a l igned around com mon 
goa ls, for c larifying roles and responsi b i l i­
ties, for operati ng accord ing to a shared set 
of behaviora l  norms, and so on. 
U nfortu nately, such workshops are usu­
a l ly the r ight solution to the wrong prob­
lems. F i rst, the most critica l breakdowns i n  
col l aboration typica l ly occur not on actual 
teams but in the rapid and unstructu red 
i nteractions between d ifferent grou ps 
with i n  the organ ization. For example, 
someone from R&D wi l l  spend weeks un­
successfu l ly tryi ng to get help from manu­
factu ring to run a few tests on a new proto­
type. Meanwhi le, people in manufacturi ng 
beg i n  to compla in about arrogant engi­
neers from R&D expecting them to drop 
everyth ing to hel p with another one of 
R&D's pet projects. Clearly, the need for 
col l aboration extends to areas other than a 
formal  team. 
The second problem is that breakdowns 
in col l aboration a lmost a lways resu lt from 
fundamenta l differences among busi ness 
functions and d ivisions. Teamwork tra in­
i ng offers l ittle gu idance on how to work 
together in the context ofcompeti ng objec­
tives and l i m ited resources. I ndeed, the fre­
quent emphasis on common goa ls  fu rther 
stigmatizes the idea of confl ict in organ iza­
tions where an emphasis on "pol ite" be­
havior regu la rly prevents effective problem 
solving. People who need to col laborate 
more effectively usua l ly don't need to a l ign 
around and work toward a common goa l .  
They need to qu ickly and creatively solve 
problems by manag ing the inevitable con­
fl ict so that it works i n  the ir  favor. 
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An effective incentive system will 
ensure collaboration. 
It's a tanta l iz ing proposition: You can ha rd­
wire col laboration i nto you r  organ ization 
by reward ing col l aborative behavior. Sales­
people receive bonuses not only for h itti ng 
targets for the ir  own d ivis ion's products 
but a lso for h itting cross-sel l i ng targets. 
Staff in corporate support functions l i ke IT 
and procurement have pa rt of the i r  bo­
nuses determi ned by positive feedback 
from their i nternal c l ients. 
Unfortunately, the resu lts of such pro­
grams are usua l ly d isappointing. Despite 
greater financia l  i ncentives, for example, 
salespeople conti nue to focus on the sales 
of the ir  own products to the detriment of 
sel l i ng i ntegrated sol utions. Employees 
conti nue to perceive the IT and procure­
ment departments as d ifficu lt to work 
with, too focused on the i r  own priorities. 
Why such poor resu lts? To some extent, it's 
because ind ividua ls th i n k-for the most 
part correctly-that if they perform wel l  i n  
the i r  own operation they w i l l  b e  "taken 
care of" by the ir  bosses. I n  add ition, many 
people find that the costs of worki ng with 
i nd ividuals in other parts of the organ iza­
tion-the extra time requ i red, the aggrava­
tion-g reatly outweigh  the rewards for 
doing so. 
Certa i n ly, misa l i gned i ncentives can be 
a tremendous obstacle to cross-boundary 
col laboration. But even the most carefu l ly 
constructed i ncentives won't e l im inate ten­
sions between people with com peti ng 
busi ness objectives. An i ncentive is too 
b lunt an i nstru ment to enable opti mal  res­
ol ution of the hundreds of d ifferent trade­
offs that need to be made i n  a complex or­
gan ization. What's more, overemphasis on 
incentives can create a cu lture i n  which 
people say, " If the com pany wanted me to 
do that, they wou ld bu i ld  it i nto my comp 
plan:· I ronica l ly, focusi ng on i ncentives as 
a means to encou rage col l aboration can 
end up underm in i ng it. 
Organizations can be structured 
for collaboration. 
Many managers look for structu ra l and 
procedu ra l  solutions-cross-fu nctional 
task forces, col l aborative "g rou pware;• 
com plex webs of dotted reporti ng Ii nes on 
the organ ization chart-to create g reater 
i nternal col l aboration. But bring i ng people 
together is very different from getti ng 
them to col laborate. 
Consider the fol low ing scenario. I ndi­
vidua l  i nformation technology depart­
ments have been stripped out of a com­
pany's busi ness un its and moved to a 
corporatewide, sha red-services IT organ i­
zation. Senior managers rig htly recog n ize 
that th is  ki nd of change is a rec i pe for con­
fl ict because va rious g rou ps w i l l  now es­
senti a l ly compete with one another for 
sca rce IT resou rces. So managers try 
mighti ly to desig n  confl ict out of, and col­
l aboration i nto, the new organ ization. For 
exam ple, to enable col l aborative decis ion 
maki ng with i n  IT and between IT and the 
busi ness u n its, busi ness un its a re re­
qu i red to enter requests for IT support 
i nto a computerized tracki ng system. The 
system is desig ned to enable managers 
with i n  the IT organ ization to prioritize 
projects a nd opti ma l ly deploy resources 
to meet the various requests. 
Despite pa i nstaking process des ign,  re­
su lts a re d i sappoi nti ng. To avoid the i nevi­
table confl icts between busi ness un its a nd 
IT over project prioritization, managers 
i n  the busi ness un its qu ickly learn to 
bring the i r  requests to those they know i n  
the IT organ ization rather tha n  enteri ng 
the requests i nto the new system.  Conse­
quently, IT professionals assume that a ny 
project i n  the system is a lower priority­
fu rther d i scou rag i ng use of the system.  
People's i nab i l ity to dea l effectively with 
confl ict has undermi ned a new process 
specifica l ly desig ned to foster organ iza­
tiona l  col l aboration. 
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that are likely to emerge from discussions that 
draw on a multitude of objectives and perspec­
tives. There is an array of conflict resolution 
methods a company can use. But to be effec­
tive, they should offer a clear, step-by-step pro­
cess for parties to follow. They should also be 
made an integral part of existing business ac­
tivities-account planning, sourcing, R&D 
budgeting, and the like. If conflict resolution is 
set up as a separate, exception-based process­
a kind of organizational appeals court-it will 
likely wither away once initial managerial en­
thusiasm wanes. 
At Intel, new employees learn a common 
method and language for decision making and 
conflict resolution. The company puts them 
through training in which they learn to use a 
variety of tools for handling discord. Not only 
does the training show that top management 
sees disagreements as an inevitable aspect of 
doing business, it also provides a common 
framework that expedites conflict resolution. 
Little time is wasted in figuring out the best 
way to handle a disagreement or trading accu­
sations about "not being a team player"; 
guided by this clearly defined process, people 
can devote their time and energy to exploring 
and constructively evaluating a variety of op­
tions for how to move forward. Intel's system­
atic method for working through differences 
has helped sustain some of the company's hall­
mark qualities: innovation, operational effi­
ciency, and the ability to make and implement 
hard decisions in the face of complex strategic 
choices. 
Provide people with criteria for making 
trad�ffs. At our hypothetical Matrix Corpo­
ration, senior managers overseeing cross-unit 
sales teams often admonish those teams to "do 
what's right for the customer:' Unfortunately, 
this exhortation isn't much help when conflict 
arises. Given Matrix's ability to offer numer­
ous combinations of products and services, 
company managers-each with different 
training and experience and access to different 
information, not to mention different unit pri­
orities-have, not surprisingly, different opin­
ions about how best to meet customers' needs. 
Similar clashes in perspective result when ex­
asperated senior managers tell squabbling 
team members to set aside their differences 
and "put Matrix's interests first'' That's be­
cause it isn't always clear what's best for the 
company given the complex interplay among 
Matrix's objectives for revenue, profitability, 
market share, and long-term growth. 
Even when companies equip people with a 
common method for resolving conflict, em­
ployees often will still need to make zero-sum 
trade-offs between competing priorities. That 
task is made much easier and less contentious 
when top management can clearly articulate 
the criteria for making such choices. Obvi­
ously, it's not easy to reduce a company's strat­
egy to clearly defined trade-offs, but it's worth 
trying. For example, salespeople who know 
that five points of market share are more im­
portant than a ten point increase on a cus­
tomer satisfaction scale are much better 
equipped to make strategic concessions when 
the needs and priorities of different parts of 
the business conflict. And even when the cri­
teria do not lead to a straightforward answer, 
the guidelines can at least foster productive 
conversations by providing an objective focus. 
Establishing such criteria also sends a clear 
signal from management that it views conflict 
as an inevitable result of managing a complex 
business. 
At Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, 
the strategic decision to rely more and more on 
alliances with other organizations has signifi­
cantly increased the potential for disagree­
ment in an organization long accustomed to 
developing capabilities in-house. Decisions 
about whether to build new capabilities, buy 
them outright, or gain access to them through 
alliances are natural flashpoints for conflict 
among internal groups. The health insurer 
might have tried to minimize such conflict 
through a structural solution, giving a particu­
lar group the authority to make decisions con­
cerning whether, for instance, to develop a new 
claims-processing system in-house, to do so 
jointly with an alliance partner, or to license or 
acquire an existing system from a third party. 
Instead, the company established a set of crite­
ria designed to help various groups within the 
organization-for example, the enterprise alli­
ance group, IT, and marketing-to collectively 
make such decisions. 
The criteria are embodied in a spreadsheet­
type tool that guides people in assessing the 
trade-offs involved-say, between speed in get­
ting a new process up and running versus en­
suring its seamless integration with existing 
ones-when deciding whether to build, buy, or 
ally. People no longer debate back and forth 
























































across a table, advocating their preferred out­
comes. Instead, they sit around the table and 
together apply a common set of trade-off crite­
ria to the decision at hand. Toe resulting in­
sights into the pros and cons of each approach 
enable more effective execution, no matter 
which path is chosen. (For a simplified version 
of the trade-off tool, see the exhibit "Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield: Build, Buy, or Ally?") 
Use the escalation of confl ict as an op­
portunity for coaching. Managers at Matrix 
spend much of their time playing the organi­
zational equivalent of hot potato. Even people 
who are new to the company learn within 
weeks that the best thing to do with cross-unit 
conflict is to toss it up the management chain. 
Immediate supervisors take a quick pass at re­
solving the dispute but, being busy them­
selves, usually pass it up to their supervisors. 
Those supervisors do the same, and before 
long the problem lands in the lap of a senior­
level manager, who then spends much of his 
time resolving disagreements. Clearly, this 
isn't ideal. Because the senior managers are a 
number of steps removed from the source of 
the controversy, they rarely have a good un­
derstanding of the situation. Furthermore, the 
more time they spend resolving internal 
clashes, the less time they spend engaged in 
the business, and the more isolated they are 
from the very information they need to re­
solve the disputes dumped in their laps. Mean-
Blue Cross and Blue Shield: Build, Buy, or Ally? 
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One of the most effective ways sen ior  manag­
ers ca n he l p resolve cross-u nit confl ict is by 
g iv ing  people the criter ia for maki ng trade­
offs when the needs of d ifferent pa rts of the 
bus i ness a re at odds with one another. At 
B l ue  Cross and B l ue Sh ie ld of F lor ida, there 
a re often conflicti ng perspectives over 
whether to bu i ld new capab i l ities (for exa m­
p le, a new c l a ims-processi ng system, as i n  the 
hypothetical exam ple below), acq u i re them, 
or  g a i n  access to them th roug h an a l l i a nce. 
The com pa ny uses a grid-l i ke poster (a s im­
p l ified vers ion of which is shown here) that 
he lps mu lt ip le parties ana lyze the trade-offs 
associ ated with these th ree options. By 
checki ng various boxes i n  the g rid using per­
sona l ized ma rkers, pa rtic i pants i nd icate how 
they assess a particu l a r  option agai nst a vari­
ety of criter ia :  for exam ple, the date by which 
the new capab i l ity needs to be i m plemented; 
the ava i lab i l ity of i nterna l  resou rces such as 
capita l  and staff needed to develop the ca pa­
b i l ity; and the deg ree of i nteg ration requ i red 
w ith existi ng products a nd processes. The 
table format makes criter ia  and trade-offs 
easy to com pare. The v isua l  depiction of peo-
pie's "votes" and the ensu ing d i scussion hel p 
i nd ivid ua l s  see how the i r  d ifferences often 
a rise from such factors as access to d ifferent 
data or d iffere nt prioritiz i ng of objectives. As 
debate u nfolds-a nd as people move thei r  
markers i n  response to new i nformation­
they ca n see where they a re a l i g ned and 
where a nd why they separate i nto s ig n ificant 
factions of d i sag reement. Eventua l ly, the cri­
teria-based d i a logue tends to prod uce a pre­
pondera nce of m arkers i n  one of the th ree 
rows, th us y ie ld i ng operationa l  consensus 
a round a dec is ion .  
New Claims-Processing System 
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Implementation Experience oflnternal Volatility of Complexity of External Degree of Required 










High to ✓ 
m
x 




low low High High 




xX; *I ✓ v X  




Participant 1 = / Participant 2 = " Participant 3 = ·;(;r Participant 4 = X Participant 5 = )( Source: Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida 
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW • MARCH 2005 PAGE 5 
Want Col l aboration? 
while, Matrix employees get so little opportu­
nity to learn about how to deal with conflict 
that it becomes not only expedient but almost 
necessary for them to quickly bump conflict 
up the management chain. 
While Matrix's story may sound extreme, 
we can hardly count the number of companies 
we've seen that operate this way. And even in 
the best of situations-for example, where a 
companywide conflict-management process is 
in place and where trade-off criteria are well 
understood-there is still a natural tendency 
for people to let their bosses sort out disputes. 
Senior managers contribute to this tendency 
by quickly resolving the problems presented to 
them. While this may be the fastest and easiest 
way to fix the problems, it encourages people 
to punt issues upstairs at the first sign of diffi-
culty. Instead, managers should treat escala­
tions as opportunities to help employees be­
come better at resolving conflict. (For an 
example of how managers can help their em­
ployees improve their conflict resolution skills, 
see the exhibit "IBM: Coaching for Conflict.") 
At KIA-Tencor, a major manufacturer of 
semiconductor production equipment, a mate­
rials executive in each division oversees a num­
ber of buyers who procure the materials and 
component parts for machines that the divi­
sion makes. When negotiating a companywide 
contract with a supplier, a buyer often must 
work with the company commodity manager, 
as well as with buyers from other divisions 
who deal with the same supplier. There is 
often conflict, for example, over the delivery 
terms for components supplied to two or more 
IBM: Coaching for Conflict 
Managers can reduce the repeated esca l ation l i ne resou rces to hel p them coach others. One 
of confl ict up the management cha i n  by hel p- tool on the corporate i ntranet (an edited ex-
i ng employees learn how to resolve d i sputes cerpt of which is shown here) wa l ks manag-
themselves. At I BM ,  executives get tra i n i ng ers through a variety of conversations they 
in confl ict management a nd are offered on- might have with a d i rect report who i s  strug-
g l i ng to resolve a d ispute with people from 
one or more g roups i n  the company-some 
of whom, by des ign ,  w i l l  be consu lted to get 
the i r  views but won't be involved i n  negoti at­
i ng the fina l  decis ion. 
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If you hear from someone 
reporting to you that . . .  
"Everyone still insists on being 
a decision maker:' 
"If I consult with this person 
up front, he might try 
to force an answer on me 
or create roadblocks to my 
efforts to move forward:' 
"I have consulted with all 
the right parties and have 
crafted, by all accounts, 
a good plan. But the decision 
makers cannot settle on 
a final decision:' 
The problem 
could be that . . .  
The people your report is deal-
ing with remain concerned 
that unless they have a formal 
voice in making the decision-
or a key piece of the decision-
their needs and interests won't 
be taken into account. 
The person you are coaching 
may be overlooking the risks of 
not asking for input-mainly, 
that any decision arrived at 
without input could be sabo-
taged later on. 
The right people were included 
in the negotiating group, but the 
process for negotiating a final 
decision was not determined. 
And you could help your report 
by saying something like . . .  
"You might want to explain why people are being consulted and how 
this information will be used:' 
"Are there ways to break this decision apart into a series of subissues 
and assign decision-making roles around those subissues?" 
"Consider talking to the group about the costs of having everyone 
involved in the final decision:' 
"How would you ask someone for input? What would you tell her about 
your purpose in seeking it? What questions would you ask? What would 
you say if she put forth a solution and resisted discussing other options?" 
"Is there a way to manage the risk that she will try to block your efforts 
other than by not consulting her at all? If you consult with her now, might 
that in fact lower the risk that she will try to derail your efforts later?'' 
"What are the ground rules for how decisions will be made? Do all those 
in the group need to agree? Must the majority agree? Or just those with 
the greatest competence?'' 
"What interests underlie the objective of having everyone agree? Is there 



















































































































































divisions under the contract. In such cases, the 
commodity manager and the division materi­
als executive will push the division buyer to 
consider the needs of the other divisions, alter­
natives that might best address the collective 
needs of the different divisions, and the stan­
dards to be applied in assessing the trade-offs 
between alternatives. The aim is to help the 
buyer see solutions that haven't yet been con­
sidered and to resolve the conflict with the 
buyer in the other division. 
Initially, this approach required more time 
from managers than if they had simply made 
the decisions themselves. But it has paid off in 
fewer disputes that senior managers need to 
resolve, speedier contract negotiation, and 
improved contract terms both for the com­
pany as a whole and for multiple divisions. 
For example, the buyers from three KLA-Ten­
cor product divisions recently locked horns 
over a global contract with a key supplier. At 
issue was the trade-off between two variables: 
one, the supplier's level of liability for materi­
als it needs to purchase in order to fulfill or­
ders and, two, the flexibility granted the KLA­
Tencor divisions in modifying the size of the 
orders and their required lead times. Each di­
vision demanded a different balance between 
these two factors, and the buyers took the 
conflict to their managers, wondering if they 
should try to negotiate each of the different 
trade-offs into the contract or pick among 
them. After being coached to consider how 
each division's business model shaped its pref­
erence-and using this understanding to 
jointly brainstorm alternatives-the buyers 
and commodity manager arrived at a creative 
solution that worked for everyone: They 
would request a clause in the contract that al­
lowed them to increase and decrease flexibil­
ity in order volume and lead time, with corre­
sponding changes in supplier liability, as 
required by changing market conditions. 
Strategies for Managing Conflict 
upon Escalation 
Equipped with common conflict resolution 
methods and trade-off criteria, and supported 
by systematic coaching, people are better able 
to resolve conflict on their own. But certain 
complex disputes will inevitably need to be de­
cided by superiors. Consequently, managers 
must ensure that, upon escalation, conflict is 
resolved constructively and efficiently-and 
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in ways that model desired behaviors. 
Establish and enforce a requirement of 
joint escalation. Let's again consider the situa­
tion at Matrix. In a typical conflict, three sales­
people from different divisions become in­
volved in a dispute over pricing. Frustrated, 
one of them decides to hand the problem up 
to his boss, explaining the situation in a short 
voice-mail message. The message offers little 
more than bare acknowledgment of the other 
salespeoples' viewpoints. The manager then 
determines, on the basis of what he knows 
about the situation, the solution to the prob­
lem. The salesperson, armed with his boss's 
decision, returns to his counterparts and 
shares with them the verdict-which, given 
the process, is simply a stronger version of the 
solution the salesperson had put forward in 
the first place. But wait! The other two sales­
people have also gone to their managers and 
carried back stronger versions of their solu­
tions. At this point, each salesperson is locked 
into what is now "my manager's view" of the 
right pricing scheme. The problem, already 
thorny, has become even more intractable. 
The best way to avoid this kind of debilitat­
ing deadlock is for people to present a dis­
agreement jointly to their boss or bosses. This 
will reduce or even eliminate the suspicion, 
surprises, and damaged personal relationships 
ordinarily associated with unilateral escala­
tion. It will also guarantee that the ultimate 
decision maker has access to a wide array of 
perspectives on the conflict, its causes, and the 
various ways it might be resolved Further­
more, companies that require people to share 
responsibility for the escalation of a conflict 
often see a decrease in the number of prob­
lems that are pushed up the management 
chain. Joint escalation helps create the kind of 
accountability that is lacking when people 
know they can provide their side of an issue to 
their own manager and blame others when 
things don't work out. 
A few years ago, after a merger that re­
sulted in a much larger and more complex or­
ganization, senior managers at the Canadian 
telecommunications company Telus found 
themselves virtually paralyzed by a daily bar­
rage of unilateral escalations. Just determin­
ing who was dealing with what and who 
should be talking to whom took up huge 
amounts of senior management's time. So the 
company made joint escalation a central 
Want Col l aboration? 
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tenet of its new organizationwide protocols 
for conflict resolution-a requirement given 
teeth by managers' refusal to respond to uni­
lateral escalation. When a conflict occurred 
among managers in different departments 
concerning, say, the allocation of resources 
among the departments, the managers were 
required to jointly describe the problem, 
what had been done so far to resolve it, and 
its possible solutions. Then they had to send a 
joint write-up of the situation to each of their 
bosses and stand ready to appear together 
and answer questions when those bosses met 
to work through a solution. In many cases, 
the requirement of systematically document­
ing the conflict and efforts to resolve it-be­
cause it forced people to make such efforts­
led to a problem being resolved on the spot, 
without having to be kicked upstairs. Within 
weeks, this process resulted in the resolution 
of hundreds of issues that had been stalled for 
months in the newly merged organization. 
Ensure that managers resolve escalated 
conflicts directly with their counterparts. 
Let's return to the three salespeople at Matrix 
who took their dispute over pricing to their re­
spective bosses and then met again, only to 
find themselves further from agreement than 
before. So what did they do at that point? They 
sent the problem back to their bosses. These 
three bosses, each of whom thought he'd al­
ready resolved the issue, decided the easiest 
thing to do would be to escalate it themselves. 
This would save them time and put the con­
flict before senior managers with the broad 
view seemingly needed to make a decision. 
Unfortunately, by doing this, the three bosses 
simply perpetuated the situation their sales­
people had created, putting forward a biased 
viewpoint and leaving it to their own manag­
ers to come up with an answer. In the end, the 
decision was made unilaterally by the senior 
manager with the most organizational clout. 
This result bred resentment back down the 
management chain. A sense of"we'll win next 
time" took hold, ensuring that future conflict 
would be even more difficult to resolve. 
It's not unusual to see managers react to es­
calations from their employees by simply pass­
ing conflicts up their own functional or divi­
sional chains until they reach a senior 
executive involved with all the affected func­
tions or divisions. Besides providing a poor ex­
ample for others in the organization, this can 
be disastrous for a company that needs to 
move quickly. To avoid wasting time, a man­
ager somewhere along the chain might try to 
resolve the problem swiftly and decisively by 
herself But this, too, has its costs. In a complex 
organization, where many issues have signifi­
cant implications for numerous parts of the 
business, unilateral responses to unilateral es­
calations are a recipe for inefficiency, bad deci­
sions, and ill feelings. 
The solution to these problems is a commit­
ment by managers-a commitment codified in 
a formal policy-to deal with escalated conflict 
directly with their counterparts. Of course, 
doing this can feel cumbersome, especially 
when an issue is time-sensitive. But resolving 
the problem early on is ultimately more effi­
cient than trying to sort it out later, after a de­
cision becomes known because it has nega­
tively affected some part of the business. 
In the 199os, IBM's sales and delivery orga­
nization became increasingly complex as the 
company reintegrated previously independent 
divisions and reorganized itself to provide cus­
tomers with full solutions of bundled products 
and services. Senior executives soon recog­
nized that managers were not dealing with es­
calated conflicts and that relationships among 
them were strained because they failed to con­
sult and coordinate around cross-unit issues. 
This led to the creation of a forum called the 
Market Growth Workshop (a name carefully 
chosen to send a message throughout the com­
pany that getting cross-unit conflict resolved 
was critical to meeting customer needs and, in 
tum, growing market share). These monthly 
conference calls brought together managers, 
salespeople, and frontline product specialists 
from across the company to discuss and resolve 
cross-unit conflicts that were hindering impor­
tant sales-for example, the difficulty salespeo­
ple faced in getting needed technical resources 
from overstretched product groups. 
The Market Growth Workshops weren't suc­
cessful right away. In the beginning, busy se­
nior managers, reluctant to spend time on is­
sues that often hadn't been carefully thought 
through, began sending their subordinates to 
the meetings-which made it even more diffi­
cult to resolve the problems discussed So the 
company developed a simple preparation tem­
plate that forced people to document and ana­
lyze disputes before the conference calls. Se­
nior managers, realizing the problems created 





















































by their absence, recommitted themselves to 
attending the meetings. Over time, as complex 
conflicts were resolved during these sessions 
and significant sales were closed, attendees 
began to see these meetings as an opportunity 
to be involved in the resolution of high-stakes, 
high-visibility issues. 
Make the process for escalated conflict res­
olution transparent. When a sales conflict is 
resolved by a Matrix senior manager, the word 
comes down the management chain in the 
form of an action item: Put together an offer­
ing with this particular mix of products and 
services at these prices. The only elaboration 
may be an admonishment to "get the sales 
team together, work up a proposal, and get 
back to the customer as quickly as possible:' 
The problem is solved, at least for the time be­
ing. But the salespeople-unless they have 
been able to divine themes from the patterns 
of decisions made over time-are left with lit­
tle guidance on how to resolve similar issues in 
the future. They may justifiably wonder: How 
was the decision made? Based on what kinds 
of assumptions? With what kinds of trade­
offs? How might the reasoning change if the 
situation were different? 
In most companies, once managers have re­
solved a conflict, they announce the decision 
and move on. The resolution process and ra­
tionale behind the decision are left inside a 
managerial black box. While it's rarely helpful 
for managers to share all the gory details of 
their deliberations around contentious issues, 
failing to take the time to explain how a deci­
sion was reached and the factors that went 
into it squanders a major opportunity. A frank 
discussion of the trade-offs involved in deci­
sions would provide guidance to people trying 
to resolve conflicts in the future and would 
help nip in the bud the kind of speculation­
who won and who lost, which managers or 
units have the most power-that breeds mis­
trust, sparks turf battles, and otherwise im­
pedes cross-organizational collaboration. In 
general, clear communication about the reso­
lution of the conflict can increase people's will­
ingness and ability to implement decisions. 
During the past two years, IBM's Market 
Growth Workshops have evolved into a more 
structured approach to managing escalated 
conflict, known as Cross-Team Workouts. De­
signed to make conflict resolution more trans­
parent, the workouts are weekly meetings of 
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people across the organization who work to­
gether on sales and delivery issues for specific 
accounts. The meetings provide a public 
forum for resolving conflicts over account 
strategy, solution configuration, pricing, and 
delivery. Those issues that cannot be resolved 
at the local level are escalated to regional 
workout sessions attended by managers from 
product groups, services, sales, and finance. 
Attendees then communicate and explain 
meeting resolutions to their reports. Issues 
that cannot be resolved at the regional level 
are escalated to an even higher-level workout 
meeting attended by cross-unit executives 
from a larger geographic region-like the 
Americas or Asia Pacific-and chaired by the 
general manager of the region presenting the 
issue. The most complex and strategic issues 
reach this global forum. The overlapping at­
tendance at these sessions-in which the 
managers who chair one level of meeting at­
tend sessions at the next level up, thereby ob­
serving the decision-making process at that 
stage-further enhances the transparency of 
the system among different levels of the com­
pany. IBM has further formalized the process 
for the direct resolution of conflicts between 
services and product sales on large accounts 
by designating a managing director in sales 
and a global relationship partner in IBM glo­
bal services as the ultimate point of resolu­
tion for escalated conflicts. By explicitly mak­
ing the resolution of complex conflicts part of 
the job descriptions for both managing direc­
tor and global relationship partner-and by 
making that clear to others in the organiza­
tion-IBM has reduced ambiguity, increased 
transparency, and increased the efficiency 
with which conflicts are resolved. 
Tapping the Learning Latent in  
Conflict 
The six strategies we have discussed constitute 
a framework for effectively managing organi­
zational discord, one that integrates conflict 
resolution into day-to-day decision-making 
processes, thereby removing a critical barrier 
to cross-organizational collaboration. But the 
strategies also hint at something else: that con­
flict can be more than a necessary antecedent 
to collaboration. 
Let's return briefly to Matrix. More than 
three-quarters of all cross-unit sales at the com­
pany trigger disputes about pricing. Roughly 
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half of the sales lead to clashes over account 
control. A substantial number of sales also pro­
duce disagreements over the design of cus­
tomer solutions, with the conflict often rooted 
in divisions' incompatible measurement sys­
tems and the concerns of some people about 
the quality of the solutions being assembled. 
But managers are so busy trying to resolve 
these almost daily disputes that they don't see 
the patterns or sources of conflict. Interest­
ingly, if they ever wanted to identify patterns 
like these, Matrix managers might find few 
signs of them. That's because salespeople, who 
regularly hear their bosses complain about all 
the disagreements in the organization, have 
concluded that they'd better start shielding 
their superiors from discord. 
The situation at Matrix is not unusual­
most companies view conflict as an unneces­
sary nuisance-but that view is unfortunate. 
When a company begins to see conflict as a 
valuable resource that should be managed and 
exploited, it is likely to gain insight into prob­
lems that senior managers may not have 
!mown existed Because internal friction is 
often caused by unaddressed strains within an 
organization or between an organization and 
its environment, setting up methods to track 
conflict and examine its causes can provide an 
interesting new perspective on a variety of is­
sues. In the case of Matrix, taking the time to 
aggregate the experiences of individual sales­
people involved in recurring disputes would 
likely lead to better approaches to setting 
prices, establishing incentives for salespeople, 
and monitoring the company's quality control 
process. 
At Johnson & Johnson, an organization that 
has a highly decentralized structure, conflict is 
recognized as a positive aspect of cross-com­
pany collaboration. For example, a small inter­
nal group charged with facilitating sourcing col­
laboration among J&J's independent operating 
companies-particularly their outsourcing of 
clinical research services-actively works to ex­
tract lessons from conflicts. The group tracks 
and analyzes disagreements about issues such 
as what to outsource, whether and how to shift 
spending among suppliers, and what supplier 
capabilities to invest in. It hosts a council, com­
prising representatives from the various operat­
ing companies, that meets regularly to discuss 
these differences and explore their strategic im­
plications. As a result, trends in clinical research 
outsourcing are spotted and information about 
them is disseminated throughout J&J more 
quickly. The operating companies benefit from 
insights about new offshoring opportunities, 
technologies, and ways of structuring collabora­
tion with suppliers. And J&J, which can now 
piece together an accurate and global view of 
its suppliers, is better able to partner with 
them. Furthermore, the company realizes more 
value from its relationship with suppliers-yet 
another example of how the effective manage­
ment of conflict can ultimately lead to fruitful 
collaboration. 
J&J's approach is unusual but not unique. 
The benefits it offers provide further evidence 
that conflict-so often viewed as a liability to be 
avoided whenever possible-can be valuable to 
a company that !mows how to manage it. 
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Techniques that can help you seal a deal may end up torpedoing the 
relationship when it's time to put the deal into operation. 
Getting Past Yes 
Negotiating as if Implementation Mattered 
by Dan ny Erte l 
In July 1998, AT&T and BT announced a new 
50/50 joint venture that promised to bring glo­
bal interconnectivity to multinational custom­
ers. Concert, as the venture was called, was 
launched with great fanfare and even greater 
expectations: The $10 billion start-up would 
pool assets, talent, and relationships and was 
expected to log $1 billion in profits from day 
one. Just three years later, Concert was out of 
business. It had laid off 2,300 employees, an­
nounced $7 billion in charges, and returned its 
infrastructure assets to the parent companies. 
To be sure, the weak market played a role in 
Concert's demise, but the way the deal was put 
together certainly hammered a few nails into 
the coffin. 
For example, AT&T's deal makers scored 
what they probably considered a valuable win 
when they negotiated a way for AT&T Solu­
tions to retain key multinational customers for 
itself. As a result, AT&T and BT ended up in di­
rect competition for business-exactly what 
the Concert venture was supposed to help pre­
vent. For its part, BT seemingly outnegotiated 
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AT & T by refusing to contribute to AT & T's pur­
chase of the IBM Global Network. That move 
saved BT money, but it muddied Concert's 
strategy, leaving the start-up to contend with 
overlapping products. In 2000, Concert an­
nounced a complex new arrangement that was 
supposed to clarify its strategy, but many ques­
tions about account ownership, revenue recog­
nition, and competing offerings went unan­
swered. Ultimately, the two parent companies 
pulled the plug on the venture.1 
Concert is hardly the only alliance that 
began with a signed contract and a champagne 
toast but ended in bitter disappointment. Ex­
amples abound of deals that look terrific on 
paper but never materialize into effective, 
value-creating endeavors. And it's not just alli­
ances that can go bad during implementation. 
Misfortune can befall a whole range of agree­
ments that involve two or more parties-merg­
ers, acquisitions, outsourcing contracts, even 
internal projects that require the cooperation 
of more than one department. Although the 
problem often masquerades as one of execu-
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tion, its roots are anchored in the deal's incep­
tion, when negotiators act as if their main ob­
jective were to sign the deal. To be successful, 
negotiators must recognize that signing a con­
tract is just the beginning of the process of cre­
ating value. 
During the past 20 years, I've analyzed or 
assisted in hundreds of complex negotiations, 
both through my research at the Harvard Ne­
gotiation Project and through my consulting 
practice. And I've seen countless deals that 
were signed with optimism fall apart during 
implementation, despite the care and creativ­
ity with which their terms were crafted. The 
crux of the problem is that the very person ev­
eryone thinks is central to the deal-the nego­
tiator-is often the one who undermines the 
partnership's ability to succeed. The real chal­
lenge lies not in hammering out little victories 
on the way to signing on the dotted line but in 
designing a deal that works in practice. 
The Danger of Deal Makers 
It's easy to see where the deal maker mind-set 
comes from. The media glorifies big-name 
deal makers like Donald Trump, Michael 
Ovitz, and Bruce Wasserstein. Books like You 
Can Negotiate Anything, Trump: The Art of the 
Deal, and even my own partners' Getting to Yes 
all position the end of the negotiation as the 
destination. And most companies evaluate 
and compensate negotiators based on the size 
of the deals they're signing. 
But what kind of behavior does this ap­
proach create? People who view the contract 
as the conclusion and see themselves as solely 
responsible for getting there behave very dif­
ferently from those who see the agreement as 
just the beginning and believe their role is to 
ensure that the parties involved actually real­
ize the value they are trying to create. These 
two camps have conflicting opinions about the 
use of surprise and the sharing of information. 
They also differ in how much attention they 
pay to whether the parties' commitments are 
realistic, whether their stakeholders are suffi­
ciently aligned, and whether those who must 
implement the deal can establish a suitable 
working relationship with one another. (For a 
comparison of how different mind-sets affect 
negotiation behaviors, see the exhibit "Deal­
Minded Negotiators Versus Implementation­
Minded Negotiators?') 
This isn't to say deal makers are sleazy, dis-
honest, or unethical. Being a deal maker 
means being a good closer. The deal maker 
mind-set is the ideal approach in certain cir­
cumstances. For example, when negotiating 
the sale of an asset in which title will simply be 
transferred and the parties will have little or no 
need to work together, getting the signatures 
on the page really does define success. 
But frequently a signed contract represents 
a commitment to work together to create 
value. When that's the case, the manner in 
which the parties "get to yes" matters a great 
deal. Unfortunately, many organizations struc­
ture their negotiation teams and manage the 
flow of information in ways that actually hurt 
a deal's chances of being implemented well. 
An organization that embraces the deal 
maker approach, for instance, tends to struc­
ture its business development teams in a way 
that drives an ever growing stream of new 
deals. These dedicated teams, responsible for 
keeping negotiations on track and getting 
deals done, build tactical expertise, acquire 
knowledge of useful contract terms, and go on 
to sign more deals. But they also become de­
tached from implementation and are likely to 
focus more on the agreement than on its busi­
ness impact. Just think about the language 
deal-making teams use ("closing'' a deal, put­
ting a deal "to bed") and how their perfor­
mance is measured and rewarded (in terms of 
the number and size of deals closed and the 
time required to close them). These teams 
want to sign a piece of paper and book the ex­
pected value; they couldn't care less about 
launching a relationship. 
The much talked about Business Affairs en­
gine at AOL under David Colburn is one ex­
treme example. The group became so focused 
on doing deals-the larger and more lopsided 
the better-that it lost sight of the need to 
have its business partners actually remain in 
business or to have its deals produce more 
than paper value. In 2002, following internal 
investigations and probes by the SEC and the 
Department of Justice, AOL Time Warner con­
cluded it needed to restate financial results to 
account for the real value ( or lack thereof) cre­
ated by some of those deals.2 
The deal maker mentality also fosters the 
take-no-prisoners attitude common in procure­
ment organizations. The aim: Squeeze your 
counterpart for the best possible deal you can 
get. Instead of focusing on deal volume, as 

























































"S u rpri s i ng them he lps 
me. They may commit 
to someth ing  they m igh t  
not  have otherwise, a nd  
we' l l  get a better dea l." 
Assumption 
" I t 's not my ro le  to equ i p  
them with re levant i nfor­
mation or to correct the i r  
m isperceptions:' 
Assumption 
"My job i s  to get the dea l  
c losed. It 's worth putt i ng  
a l itt l e  pressu re on them 
now and cop ing with 
the i r  u n happ i ness later:' 
Assumptions 
"As long as they comm it, 
that's a l l  that matters . 
Afterwa rd , it's their prob-
lem if they don't de l iver:' 
Assum ption 
"The fewer people involved 
i n  making this decision, 
the better and faster th is 




I ntroduce new actors or 
information at strategic 
points in negotiation. 
Raise new issues at 
the end. 
Behaviors 
With ho ld  i nformat ion .  
Fa i l  to correct m i staken 
imp ress ions .  
Behaviors 
Create a rtific ia l  dead l i nes. 
Th reaten esca lat ion .  
Make "th is day on ly" offers. 
Behaviors 
Focu s  on docu ment ing 
com m itments rather than  
on test ing the pract ica l ity 
of those commitments. 
Rely on pena lty c l auses 
for p rotect ion .  
Behaviors 
L im i t  partic ipat ion in 
d i scu s s ions to decis ion 
make rs. 
Keep  outs iders i n  the 
da rk  u nt i l  it is too late 
for them to dera i l  th ings. 
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Versus 
Negotiation Tactics 















"Su rpr is ing them puts u s  
a t  r isk .  They may com m it 
to someth i ng  they ca n n ot 
de l iver or w i l l  reg ret:' 
Assumption 
"I don't want them entering 
this deal fee l ing duped. I 
want their goodwi l l  du ring 
imp lementation, not the i r  
g rudging compl iance'.' 
Assumption 
"My job is to create va l ue  
by  crafting a workab le 
agreement. I nvesting a 
l itt le extra t ime in making 
sure both sides a re a l igned 
is worth the effort'.' 
Assumption 
" I f  they fa i l  to de l iver, we 
don't get the va l u e  we 
expect. " 
Assumption 
" I f  we both fa i l  to invo lve 
key sta keho lders suffi-
c ient ly  and ear ly  enough ,  
whatever t ime we save 
now wi l l  be lost d u ri ng  
imp lementation:' 
Behaviors 
Propose agendas i n  advance 
so both pa rties can prepa re. 
Suggest questions to 
be d iscussed, and provide 
relevant data. 
Raise issues early. 
Behaviors 
Create a joint fact­
gathering group. 
Commission third-party 




Define i nterests that need 
to be considered for the 
deal to be successfu l . 
Define joint commun ica-
tion strategy. 
Behaviors 
Ask tough questions about 
both parties' ab i l ity to del iver. 
Make implementab i l ity 
a shared concern. 
Estab l i sh early wa rn ing sys-
terns and contingency p lans. 
Behaviors 
Repeated ly ask about 
stakeholders: 
Whose approva l is needed? 
Whose cooperation is 
requ i red? 


































Gett ing Past Yes 
A New Mind-Set 
business development engines do, these 
groups concentrate on how many concessions 
they can get. The desire to win outweighs the 
costs of signing a deal that cannot work in 
practice because the supplier will never be 
able to make enough money. 
Think about how companies handle nego­
tiations with outsourcing providers. Few orga­
nizations contract out enough of their work 
to have as much expertise as the providers 
themselves in negotiating deal structures, 
terms and conditions, metrics, pricing, and 
the like, so they frequently engage a third­
party adviser to help level the playing field as 
they select an outsourcer and hammer out a 
contract. Some advisers actually trumpet 
their role in commoditizing the providers' so­
lutions so they can create "apples to apples" 
comparison charts, engender competitive bid­
ding, and drive down prices. To maximize 
competitive tension, they exert tight control, 
blocking virtually all communications be­
tween would-be customers and service pro­
viders. That means the outsourcers have al­
most no opportunity to design solutions 
tailored to the customer's unique business 
drivers. 
The results are fairly predictable. The deal 
structure that both customer and provider 
teams are left to implement is the one that was 
easiest to compare with other bids, not the one 
that would have created the most value. Worse 
yet, when the negotiators on each side exit the 
process, the people responsible for making the 
deal work are virtual strangers and lack a nu­
anced understanding of why issues were han-
F ive approaches ca n he lp  you r  negotiati ng team tran s it ion from a dea l  maker  men­
ta l ity to an imp l ementati on  m i nd-set. 
1 .  Start w ith the end in mind. I mag­
i ne the dea l  1 2  months  out :  What ha s  
gone  w rong ?  H ow do  you  know if i t's a 
success? Who s h o u l d  have been i n­
volved ea r l i e r? 
2. He lp them prepare, too. S u rp r i s­
i ng the othe r  s i d e  doesn't make sen se, 
beca u se i f  they p rom i se th i ng s  they 
ca n't d e l i ver, you both lose .  
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3. Treat a l ignment as a shared re­
sponsib i l ity. If your  cou nterpa rt's i nter­
ests a ren't a l i g ned , it's you r  prob lem, too. 
4. Send one message. Br ief i mple­
mentation teams on both s ides of the 
deal together so everyone has the same 
i nformation .  
5. Manage negotiation l i ke a busi­
ness process. Combine a d i sc i p l i ned 
prepa ration  process with postnegotiat ion 
rev iews. 
dled the way they were. Furthermore, neither 
side has earned the trust of its partner during 
negotiations. The hard feelings created by the 
hired guns can linger for years. 
The fact is, organizations that depend on ne­
gotiations for growth can't afford to abdicate 
management responsibility for the process. It 
would be foolhardy to leave negotiations en­
tirely up to the individual wits and skills of 
those sitting at the table on any given day. 
That's why some corporations have taken steps 
to make negotiation an organizational compe­
tence. They have made the process more struc­
tured by, for instance, applying Six Sigma disci­
pline or community of practice principles to 
improve outcomes and learn from past experi­
ences. 
Sarbanes-Oxley and an emphasis on greater 
management accountability will only rein­
force this trend. As more companies (and their 
auditors) recognize the need to move to a con­
trols-based approach for their deal-making pro­
cesses-be they in sales, sourcing, or business 
development-they will need to implement 
metrics, tools, and process disciplines that pre­
serve creativity and let managers truly manage 
negotiators. How they do so, and how they de­
fine the role of the negotiator, will determine 
whether deals end up creating or destroying 
value. 
Negotiating for Implementation 
Making the leap to an implementation mind­
set requires five shifts. 
1 .  Sta rt w ith the end i n  m i nd .  For the in­
volved parties to reap the benefits outlined in 
the agreement, goodwill and collaboration are 
needed during implementation. That's why 
negotiation teams should carry out a simple 
"benefit of hindsight" exercise as part of their 
preparation. 
Imagine that it is 12 months into the deal, 
and ask yourself: 
Is the deal working? What metrics are we us­
ing? If quantitative metrics are too hard to de­
fine, what other indications of success can we 
use? 
What has gone wrong so far? What have we 
done to put things back on course? What were 
some early warning signals that the deal may 
not meet its objectives? 
What capabilities are necessary to accomplish 
our objectives? What processes and tools must 
be in place? What skills must the irnplementa-



































































































tion teams have? What attitudes or assump­
tions are required of those who must imple­
ment the deal? Who has tried to block 
implementation, and how have we responded? 
If negotiators are required to answer those 
kinds of questions before the deal is finalized, 
they cannot help but behave differently. For 
example, if the negotiators of the Concert joint 
venture had followed that line of questioning 
before closing the deal, they might have asked 
themselves, "What good is winning the right to 
keep customers out of the deal if doing so 
leads to competition between the alliance's 
parents? And if we have to take that risk, can 
we put in mechanisms now to help mitigate 
it?" Raising those tough questions probably 
wouldn't have made a negotiator popular, but 
it might have led to different terms in the deal 
and certainly to different processes and met­
rics in the implementation plan. 
Most organizations with experience in nego­
tiating complex deals know that some terms 
have a tendency to come back and bite them 
during implementation. For example, in 50/50 
ventures, the partner with greater leverage 
often secures the right to break ties if the new 
venture's steering committee should ever come 
to an impasse on an issue. In practice, though, 
that means executives from the dominant 
party who go into negotiations to resolve such 
impasses don't really have to engage with the 
other side. At the end of the day, they know 
they can simply impose their decision. But 
when that happens, the relationship is fre­
quently broken beyond repair. 
Tom Finn, vice president of strategic plan­
ning and alliances at Procter & Gamble Phar­
maceuticals, has made it his mission to incor­
porate tough lessons like that into the 
negotiation process itself. Although Finn's alli­
ance management responsibilities technically 
don't start until after a deal has been negoti­
ated by the P&G Pharmaceuticals business de­
velopment organization, Finn jumps into the 
negotiation process to ensure negotiators do 
not bargain for terms that will cause trouble 
down the road. "It's not just a matter of a win­
win philosophy;' he says. "It's about incorporat­
ing our alliance managers' hard-won experi­
ence with terms that cause implementation 
problems and not letting those terms into our 
deals?' 
Finn and his team avoid things like step­
down royalties and unequal profit splits with 
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50/50 expense sharing, to name just a few. "It's 
important that the partners be provided [with] 
incentives to do the right thing;' Finn says. 
"When those incentives shift, you tend to end 
up [with] difficulties?' Step-down royalties, for 
instance, are a common structure in the indus­
try. They're predicated on the assumption that 
a brand is made or lost in the first three years, 
so that thereafter, payments to the originator 
should go down. But P&G Pharmaceuticals be­
lieves it is important to provide incentives to 
the partner to continue to work hard over 
time. As for concerns about overpaying for the 
licensed compound in the latter years of the 
contract, Finn asserts that "leaving some 
money on the table is OK if you realize that the 
most expensive deal is one that fails?' 
2. He lp them prepare, too. If implementa­
tion is the name of the game, then coming to 
the table well prepared is necessary-but not 
sufficient. Your counterpart must also be pre­
pared to negotiate a workable deal. Some nego­
tiators believe they can gain advantage by sur­
prising the other side. But surprise confers 
advantage only because the counterpart has 
failed to think through all the implications of a 
proposal and might mistakenly commit to 
something it wouldn't have if it had been better 
prepared. While that kind of an advantage 
might pay off in a simple buy-sell transaction, it 
fails miserably-for both sides-in any situation 
that requires a long-term working relationship. 
That's why it's in your best interest to en­
gage with your counterpart before negotia­
tions start. Encourage the other party to do its 
homework and consult with its internal stake­
holders before and throughout the negotiation 
process. Let the team know who you think the 
key players are, who should be involved early 
on, how you hope to build implementation 
planning into the negotiation process, and 
what key questions you are asking yourself. 
Take the example of Equitas, a major rein­
surer in the London market. When preparing 
for commutations negotiations-whereby two 
reinsurers settle their mutual book of busi­
ness-the company sends its counterpart a 
thorough kickoff package, which is used as the 
agenda for the negotiation launch meeting. 
This "commutations action pack" describes 
how the reinsurer's own commutations depart­
ment is organized, what its preferred approach 
to a commutations negotiation is, and what 
stages it follows. It also includes a suggested 
Gett ing Past Yes 
"Leaving some money on 
the table is OK if you 
realize that the most 
expensive deal is one that 
fails." 
PAGE 5 
Gett ing Past Yes 
PAGE 6 
approach to policy reconciliation and due dili­
gence and explains what data the reinsurer has 
available-even acknowledging its imperfec­
tions and gaps. The package describes critical 
issues for the reinsurer and provides sample 
agreements and memorandums for various 
stages of the process. 
The kickoff meeting thus offers a structured 
environment in which the parties can educate 
each other on their decision-making processes 
and their expectations for the deal. The lan­
guage of the commutations action pack and 
the collaborative spirit of the kickoff meeting 
are designed to help the parties get to know 
each other and settle on a way of working to­
gether before they start making the difficult 
trade-offs that will be required of them. By es­
tablishing an agreed-upon process for how and 
when to communicate with brokers about the 
deal, the two sides are better able to manage 
the tension between the need to include stake­
holders who are critical to implementation and 
the need to maintain confidentiality before the 
deal is signed. 
Aventis Pharma is another example of how 
measured disclosure of background and other 
information can pave the way to smoother ne­
gotiations and stronger implementation. Like 
many of its peers, the British pharmaceutical 
giant wants potential biotech partners to see it 
as a partner of choice and value a relationship 
with the company for more than the size of the 
royalty check involved. To that end, Aventis 
has developed and piloted a "negotiation 
launch" process, which it describes as a meet­
ing during which parties about to enter into 
formal negotiations plan together for those ne­
gotiations. Such collaboration allows both 
sides to identify potential issues and set up an 
agreed upon process and time line. The com­
pany asserts that while "formally launching ne­
gotiations with a counterpart may seem unor­
thodox to some;' the entire negotiation process 
runs more efficiently and effectively when 
partners "take the time to discuss how they will 
negotiate before beginning:' 
3. Treat a l ignment as a shared responsibi l­
ity. If their interests are not aligned, and they 
cannot deliver fully, that's not just their prob­
lem-it's your problem, too. 
Unfortunately, deal makers often rely on se­
crecy to achieve their goals (after all, a stake­
holder who doesn't know about a deal can't ob­
ject) . But leaving internal stakeholders in the 
dark about a potential deal can have negative 
consequences. Individuals and departments 
that will be directly affected don't have a 
chance to weigh in with suggestions to miti­
gate risks or improve the outcome. And people 
with relevant information about the deal don't 
share it, because they have no idea it's needed. 
Instead, the typical reaction managers have 
when confronted late in the game with news 
of a deal that will affect their department is 
"Not with my FfEs, you don't:' 
Turning a blind eye to likely alignment 
problems on the other side of the table is one 
of the leading reasons alliances break down 
and one of the major sources of conflict in out­
sourcing deals. Many companies, for instance, 
have outsourced some of their human resource 
or finance and accounting processes. Service 
providers, for their part, often move labor-in­
tensive processes to Web-based self-service sys­
tems to gain process efficiencies. If users find 
the new self-service system frustrating or in­
timidating, though, they make repeated (and 
expensive) calls to service centers or fax in 
handwritten forms. As a result, processing costs 
jump from pennies per transaction to tens of 
dollars per transaction. 
But during the initial negotiation, buyers 
routinely fail to disclose just how undisciplined 
their processes are and how resistant to change 
their cultures might be. After all, they think, 
those problems will be the provider's headache 
once the deal is signed. Meanwhile, to make 
requested price concessions, providers often 
drop line items from their proposals intended 
to educate employees and support the new 
process. In exchange for such concessions, with 
a wink and a nod, negotiators assure the pro­
vider that the buyers will dedicate internal re­
sources to change-management and communi­
cation efforts. No one asks whether business 
unit managers support the deal or whether 
function leaders are prepared to make the 
transition from managing the actual work to 
managing the relationship with an external 
provider. Everyone simply agrees, the deal is 
signed, and the frustration begins. 
As managers and employees work around 
the new self-service system, the provider's costs 
increase, the service levels fall (because the 
provider was not staffed for the high level of 
calls and faxes), and customer satisfaction 
plummets. Finger-pointing ensues, which must 
then be addressed through expensive additions 





















































to the contract, costly modifications to pro­
cesses and technology, and additional burdens 
on a communication and change effort already 
laden with baggage from the initial failure. 
Building alignment is among negotiators' 
least favorite activities. The deal makers often 
feel as if they are wasting precious time "nego­
tiating internally" instead of working their 
magic on the other side. But without accep­
tance of the deal by those who are essential to 
its implementation (or who can place obstacles 
in the way), proceeding with the deal is even 
more wasteful. Alignment is a classic "pay me 
now or pay me later" problem. To understand 
whether the deal will work in practice, the ne­
gotiation process must encompass not only 
subject matter experts or those with bargain­
ing authority but also those who will actually 
have to take critical actions or refrain from 
pursuing conflicting avenues later. 
Because significant deals often require both 
parties to preserve some degree of confidenti­
ality, the matter of involving the right stake­
holders at the right time is more effectively ad­
dressed jointly than unilaterally. With an 
understanding of who the different stakehold­
ers are-including those who have necessary 
information, those who hold critical budgets, 
those who manage important third-party rela­
tion.ships, and so on-a joint communications 
subteam can then map how, when, and with 
whom different inputs will be solicited and dif­
ferent categories of information might be 
shared. For example, some stakeholders may 
need to know that the negotiations are taking 
place but not the identity of the counterpart. 
Others may need only to be aware that the or­
ganization is seeking to form a partnership so 
they can prepare for the potential effects of an 
eventual deal. And while some must remain in 
the dark, suitable proxies should be identified 
to en.sure that their perspectives (and the roles 
they will play during implementation) are con­
sidered at the table. 
4. Send one message. Complex deals re­
quire the participation of many people during 
implementation, so once the agreement is in 
place, it's essential that the team that created 
it get everyone up to speed on the terms of the 
deal, on the mind-set under which it was nego­
tiated, and on the trade-offs that were made in 
crafting the final contract. When each imple­
mentation team is given the contract in a vac­
uum and then is left to interpret it separately, 
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each develops a different picture of what the 
deal is meant to accomplish, of the negotia­
tors' intentions, and of what wasn't actually 
written in the document but each had imag­
ined would be true in practice. 
"If your objective is to have a deal you can 
implement, then you want the actual people 
who will be there, after the negotiators move 
on, up front and listening to the dialogue and 
the give-and-take during the negotiation so 
they understand how you got to the agreed so­
lution;' says Steve Fenn, vice president for re­
tail industry and former VP for global business 
development at IBM Global Services. "But we 
can't always have the delivery executive at the 
table, and our customer doesn't always know 
who from their side is going to be around to 
lead the relation.ship:' To address this chal­
lenge, Fenn uses joint hand-off meetings, at 
which he and his counterpart brief both sides 
of the delivery equation. "We tell them what's 
in the contract, what is different or non.stand­
ard, what the schedules cover. But more im­
portant, we clarify the intent of the deal: 
Here's what we had difficulty with, and here's 
what we ended up with and why. We don't try 
to reinterpret the language of the contract but 
[ we do try] to discuss openly the spirit of the 
contract:' These meetings are usually attended 
by the individual who developed the statement 
of work, the person who priced the deal, the 
contracts and negotiation lead, and occasion­
ally legal counsel. This team briefs the project 
executive in charge of the implementation ef­
fort and the executive's direct reports. Partici­
pation on the customer side varies, because the 
early days in an outsourcing relation.ship are 
often hectic and full of turnover. But Fenn 
works with the project executive and the sales 
team to identify the key customer representa­
tives who should be invited to the hand-off 
briefing. 
Negotiators who know they have to brief 
the implementation team with their counter­
parts after the deal is signed will approach the 
entire negotiation differently. They'll start ask­
ing the sort of tough questions at the negotiat­
ing table that they imagine they'll have to field 
during the postdeal briefings. And as they 
think about how they will explain the deal to 
the delivery team, they will begin to marshal 
defensible precedents, norms, industry prac­
tices, and objective criteria. Such standards of 
legitimacy strengthen the relationship because 
Gett ing  Past Yes 
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they emphasize persuasion rather than coer­
cion. Ultimately, this practice makes a deal 
more viable because attention shifts from the 
individual negotiators and their personalities 
toward the merits of the arrangement. 
5. Manage negotiation l ike a business pro­
cess. Negotiating as if implementation mat­
tered isn't a simple task. You must worry about 
the costs and challenges of execution rather 
than just getting the other side to say yes. You 
must carry out all the internal consultations 
necessary to build alignment. And you must 
make sure your counterparts are as prepared as 
you are. Each of these actions can feel like a big 
time sink. Deal makers don't want to spend 
time negotiating with their own people to build 
alignment or risk having their counterparts 
pull out once they know all the details. If a com­
pany wants its negotiators to sign deals that cre­
ate real value, though, it has to weed out that 
deal maker mentality from its ranks. Fortu­
nately, it can be done with simple processes and 
controls. (For an example of how HP Services 
structures its negotiation process, see the side-
Negotiating Credibility 
H P  Serv i ces is g rowing in a h i g h ly com peti­
t ive m arket, and i ts success is pa rtly d u e  to i ts 
app roach to negot iati ng l a rge outso u rc i ng 
transact ions. I n  a matu r i ng  market, where 
top tier prov iders ca n demonstrate com pa ra­
ble capa b i l i t ies a nd  where pr ice va r i at ions i n­
ev i ta b ly d i m i n i sh  after com pan ies b i d  
aga i n st one a nother t ime  and  ti me  aga i n ,  a 
prov i de r's ab i l i ty to manage a re lat i o n sh i p  
a n d  bu i l d  tru st a re key d ifferent i ators. The 
negot i at ion and the set of i nteract ions  l ead­
ing up to it g i ve the customer a fi rst taste of 
what i t  w i l l  be l i ke to solve prob lems w ith the 
prov i de r  du r i n g  the l i fe of the contract. "De­
c i s i o n s  made by c l ients rega rd i ng se lection  
have a s  m uch to do w ith the com pa ny they 
want to do bus i n ess with as with pr i ce, capa­
b i l i ty, and re l i a b i l i ty;' acknowledges Steve 
Hu h n ,  H P  Servi ces' v ice pres ident of strate­
g i c  outsou rc i ng .  " N egoti at i ng these k i n d s  of 
dea l s  req u i res be i ng honest, open ,  a nd  cred i­
b le .  I nteg r ity is c r it ica l  to our cred i b i l ity:' 
H u h n's team of negoti ators u ses a we l l­
structu red process des i gned to make su re 
that the ph i losophy of i nteg r i ty i s  pervas ive 
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throughout the negot i at ion and not j ust a 
fu nct ion of who happens  to be at the ta b le  on  
any g iven d ay. I t  beg i ns w i t h  the format ion of 
a negot i at i on  team .  Beca use trans i t ion i n  
comp l ex outso u rc i ng tran sact ions represents 
a per iod of h i g h  vu l ne ra b i l ity, it i s  i m porta nt  
to i nvo lve i m p lementatio n  staff ear ly on ;  that 
way, a ny com m itments made ca n be va l i­
dated by those who w i l l  be respons i b le  for  
keep i ng them .  A typ i ca l  negoti at i on  team 
cons i sts of a bus i ness leader, or pu rsu i t  l ead ,  
who i s  usua l ly respons i b l e  for deve lop i n g  the 
bus i ness and  structu r i n g  the tran sacti on ;  a 
contract spec i a l i st, who br i ngs exper ience 
w ith outsou rc i ng contract terms and cond i­
t ions; and the p roposed c l i ent manager, who  
w i l l  be respon s i b l e  for  de l ivery. 
Negoti ati o n  leads work w ith a h i g h  deg ree 
of autonomy. H u h n  be l i eves that a negoti ato r  
w ithout a utho r i ty i s  l i ttl e  more tha n  a mes­
senger, and  messengers a re u n l i ke ly to earn 
trust or  bu i l d work i ng  re lat ionsh i ps w ith 
cou nterpa rts. At H P,  negot i ators earn that a u­
tonomy by prepa r i ng extens ive ly w ith tem­
p l ates and by rev i ew i ng key deal parameters 
bar "Negotiating Credibility?') 
More and more outsourcing and procure­
ment firms are adopting a disciplined negotia­
tion preparation process. Some even require a 
manager to review the output of that process 
before authorizing the negotiator to proceed 
with the deal. KLA-Tencor, a semiconductor 
production equipment maker, uses the elec­
tronic tools available through its supplier­
management Web site for this purpose, for ex­
ample. Its managers can capture valuable in­
formation about negotiators' practices, in­
cluding the issues they are coming up against, 
the options they are proposing, the standards 
of legitimacy they are relying on, and the 
walkaway alternatives they are considering. 
Coupled with simple postnegotiation re­
views, this information can yield powerful or­
ganizational insights. 
Preparing for successful implementation is 
hard work, and it has a lot less sizzle than the 
brinksmanship characteristic of the negotia­
tion process itself. To overcome the natural 
tendency to ignore feasibility questions, it's im-
with management. A negot iator's mandate 
does not j u st cover pr i ce :  It a l so encom passes 
ma rg i ns, cash flow, and RO I at d ifferent t imes 
in  the l i fe of the contract; the treatment of 
tra n sferred emp loyees; the ways var ious 
k i n d s  of r i sk w i l l  be a l located; and  how the re­
lat i onsh i p  w i l l  be governed .  A l l  these i nter­
ests m ust be add ressed-both i n  preparat ion  
and  at  the  negoti ation  ta b le .  
H P's outsourc i ng negot i ators a re subject 
to i nforma l rev i ews with fu l l -t ime  dea l  
coaches as we l l  as  forma l  m i l estone rev iews. 
The reviews, wh i ch  a re des ig ned to get key 
sta keho lders comm itted to im p l ementat ion ,  
ha ppen before the forma l  proposa l i s  de l i v­
e red and before the dea l  i s  s i gned .  
The pu rsu it team leade rs a ren't fi n ished 
once the agreement is s i g ned .  In fact, they re­
ta i n  respons i b i l ity d u r i n g  the tra n s it ion 
phase and a re cons idered " l i a b le" for the 
dea l 's performance d u r i ng the next 18 to 24 
months. That means negot i ators can't s imp ly 
j u m p  to the next a l l u r i ng deal .  On the con­
tra ry, they have a vested i nterest in mak ing  
su re the closed dea l actu a l ly meets its ta rgets. 
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portant for management to send a clear mes­
sage about the value of postdeal implementa­
tion. It must reward individuals, at least in 
part, based on the delivered success of the 
deals they negotiate, not on how those deals 
look on paper. This practice is fairly standard 
among outsourcing service providers; it's one 
that should be adopted more broadly. 
Improving the implementability of deals 
is not just about layering controls or captur­
ing data. After all, a manager's strength has 
much to do with the skills she chooses to 
build and reward and the example she sets 
with her own questions and actions. In the 
health care arena, where payer-provider con­
tentions are legion, forward-thinking payers 
and innovative providers are among those 
trying to change the dynamics of deals and 
develop agreements that work better. B lue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, for exam­
ple, has been working to institutionalize an 
approach to payer-provider negotiations that 
strengthens the working relationship and 
supports implementation. Training in collab­
orative negotiation tools and techniques has 
been rolled down from the senior executives 
to the negotiators to the support and analy­
sis teams. Even more important, those who 
manage relationships with providers and are 
responsible for implementing the agree­
ments are given the same training and tools. 
In other words, the entire process of putting 
the deal together, making it work, and feed­
ing the lessons learned through implementa­
tion back into the negotiation process has 
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been tightly integrated. 
Most competitive runners will tell you that if 
you train to get to the finish line, you will lose 
the race. To win, you have to envision your 
goal as just beyond the finish line so you will 
blow right past it at full speed. The same is 
true for a negotiator: If signing the document 
is your ultimate goal, you will fall short of a 
winning deal. 
The product of a negotiation isn't a docu­
ment; it's the value produced once the parties 
have done what they agreed to do. Negotiators 
who understand that prepare differently than 
deal makers do. They don't ask, "What might 
they be willing to accept?" but rather, "How do 
we create value together?" They also negotiate 
differently, recognizing that value comes not 
from a signature but from real work per­
formed long after the ink has dried. 
1. For more perspectives on Concert's demise, see Margie 
Semilof's 2001 article "Concert Plays Its Last Note" on Inter­
netWeek.com; Brian Washburn's 2000 article "Discon­
certed" on Tele.com; and Charles Hodson's 2001 article 
"Concert: What Went Wrong?" on CNN.com. 
2. See Alec Klein, "Lord of the Flies," the Washington Post, 
June 15, 2003, and Gary Rivlin, "AOL's Rough Riders;' Indus­
try Standard, October 30, 2000, for more information on 
the AOL Business Affairs department's practices. 
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Taking steps toward ''Getting 
to Yes'' at Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield of Florida 
Executive Commen tary by Bridget Booth and Matt McCredie 
Never before has there been a more opportune time 
for Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. 
(BCBSF) to benefit from the concepts of principled 
negotiation outlined in the book Getting to Yes. 
BCBSF is the industry leader in Florida, provid­
ing health benefit plans and health-related ser­
vices. The company and its subsidiaries serve 
more than six million people. However, maintain­
ing a market leadership position is difficult in light 
of the many challenges facing today's healthcare 
marketplace. 
Factors such as rising healthcare costs, in­
creased competition, consumerism, and shifting 
demographics have caused the company to search 
for new and different ways of doing business as 
customers' healthcare needs expand. Inherent in 
these new and different business models is the 
need for more collaborative business practices, 
such as those outlined in Getting to Yes. 
Different Times Call for Different Approaches 
Today's healthcare marketplace is becoming in­
creasingly consumer driven. Consumers expect 
the same level of service and convenience from 
health organizations that they receive from other 
companies, such as online retailers, banks, and 
investment firms. The Institute of the Future pre­
dicts that by the end of 20 10 ,  the health market will 
be an innovative economy demanding nontradi­
tional offerings such as wellness,  food, cosmetics, 
fashion, health information and even biosecurity. 1 
Developing alliances with other organizations is 
one way the company is positioning itself for the 
health industry of the future. BCBSF's Alliance 
Group, a small department formed in 200 1 ,  enables 
business areas to develop strategic relationships 
with other entities. 
Capitalizing on business opportunities through 
alliances enables BCBSF and other companies to 
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pursue the risks and rewards of mutually compat­
ible goals that would be difficult to achieve alone. 
Alliances include outsourcing partnerships, joint 
operating agreements,  and joint ventures. These 
alliances provide the companies with access to 
new markets,  capabilities, knowledge, and capital, 
along with the ability to share development and 
acquisition costs. Alliances also enable each party 
to bring products to market quickly in a cost-effec­
tive manner, which is critical in today's healthcare 
industry. 
BCBSF's Alliance Group is experiencing positive 
outcomes by applying concepts outlined in Getting 
to Yes and is helping to move the organization 
more toward the management concepts of prin­
cipled negotiation. Historically, however, busi­
nesses have not formally practiced or rewarded 
employees for these types of behaviors. For exam­
ple, contract negotiations between companies of­
ten focus on each individual organization champi­
oning its own positions without considering the 
other's interests .  Rewards are often linked to how 
well an organization's position is defended or 
"won" without giving thought to what bigger solu­
tions could emerge by focusing on mutual gains. 
Contract negotiations between 
companies often focus on each individual 
organization championing i ts own 
posi tions without considering the other's 
in terests. 
To expand beyond this type of traditional mind­
set , BCBSF is seeking out ways to indoctrinate the 
concepts of principled negotiation throughout the 
entire organization. Principled negotiation, accord­
ing to Getting to Yes, involves looking at issues 
based on their merits rather than defending stead-
1 10 Academy of Management Executive August 
fast positions. Its goal is to meet the underlying 
concerns of the parties. Shifting behavior away 
from a contest of wills toward this type of collab­
orative mindset can be challenging. To help make 
the transition, BCBSF is emphasizing three major 
steps: top-level executive support ; a disciplined, 
programmed approach to alliance management; 
and reinforcement of desired behaviors and re­
lated outcomes. 
BCBSF is further embracing the concepts of prin­
cipled negotiation by working with Vantage Part­
ners, a consulting firm that partners with leading 
companies to institutionalize the capability to ne­
gotiate, build, and manage critical relationships 
effectively. Initially, BCBSF was seeking external 
perspectives for establishing superior alliance 
management capabilities. As part of that process, 
the company was introduced to mutual-gains be­
havior as a necessary component of developing 
successful alliances and other collaborative rela­
t ionships .  Vantage, founded by Getting to Yes co­
author Roger Fisher, helps its clients incorporate 
concepts from the book into their daily manage­
ment practices. BCBSF has been working with 
Vantage Partners for approximately two years and 
has experienced increased trust and alignment 
with business associates as a result of implement­
ing Getting to Yes concepts. 
Putting the Concepts into Practice 
On a daily basis ,  BCBSF is learning first hand 
about the benefits of applying principled negotia­
tion concepts in its alliances, as well as the pitfalls 
of what happens when the concepts are not ap­
plied consistently. 
The company's movement toward applying Get­
ting to Yes concepts is illustrated by the formation 
and management of a strategic alliance with a key 
competitor. Availity, L.L.C. ,  a joint venture between 
subsidiaries of BCBSF and Humana, Inc. ,  was con­
ceived out of a desire to lower health costs ,  im­
prove efficiencies, and provide more t imely service 
to physicians and hospitals. Humana is one of the 
nation's leading publicly traded health benefits 
companies, with approximately seven million 
medical members in 19  states and Puerto Rico. The 
company offers coordinated health insurance cov­
erage and related services to employer groups, 
government-sponsored plans, and individuals. 
Both Humana and BCBSF were trying to reach the 
same goal of improving the manner in which hos­
pitals and physicians conducted business with 
their organizations. 
The resulting joint venture, Availity, is an Inter­
net-based solution that streamlines administrative 
workflow and improves communication between 
physicians, hospitals, payers, and pharmacies. 
Through a secure website, physicians can submit 
requests for payments, check the status of pay­
ments for services, verify patients' coverage and 
eligibility, and receive authorizations for referrals 
and other medical services online. This stream­
lined process replaces time-consuming manual in­
teractions such as phone calls and paperwork. 
Currently, there are more than 9,000 physician of­
fices, 208 hospitals, and more than 27,000 physi­
cians in Florida using the Availity platform to pro­
cess routine transactions. 
The challenges of managing a joint venture with 
a key competitor could be daunting, if not impos­
sible, without a shift in behavior by both parties to 
think of the other as a partner. Adding to the com­
plexity is the organizations' differing corporate 
cultures, due in part to their structures: Humana is 
a for-profit publicly traded company, while BCBSF 
is a private,  not-for-profit policyholder-owned mu­
tual company. In addition, Humana serves a na­
tional market . while BCBSF primarily serves Flor­
ida. The change in mindset to be collaborative vs. 
competitive in the development of this solution 
was critical to the formation and ongoing success 
of the joint venture. 
Separating the People from the Problem 
Although BCBSF had not yet institutionalized Get­
ting to Yes concepts during the early formation of 
Availity, the company became more deliberate in 
following the concepts after the alliance was op­
erational and the organization became more 
aware of the benefits of principled negotiation. 
Looking back, despite a lack of formal training in 
Getting to Yes concepts, the company uncon­
sciously implemented some of the concepts during 
the formation of Availity, which helped greatly in 
building the alliance. 
As outlined in the book. separating the people 
from the problem requires emphasizing relation­
ships by dealing directly with perceptions. BCBSF 
looked for ways to demonstrate its desire to collab­
orate by coming to the table with a sincere intent to 
build a relationship and determine common inter­
ests. Although it was not formally stated that the 
concepts of principled negotiation would be fol­
lowed, the negotiators realized that forming a suc­
cessful joint venture would require a collaborative 
approach. Both parties approached initial discus­
sions in an open manner by listening rather than 
trying to debate or persuade. The two parties in­
vested substantial amounts of time at the execu­
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says, prevention works best-and building this 
type of personal relationship "cushioned the peo­
ple on each side against the knocks of negotia­
tion." A strong relationship at the senior level 
continues to benefit the alliance today through 
subsequent governance activities. 
Once Availity was established and operational, 
BCBSF began to interact with Availity as a busi­
ness associate. This new relationship benefited 
from additional collaborative negotiation skills. 
A significant challenge in implementing the con­
cept of separating the people from the problem 
was the complex nature of the multiple relation­
ships inherent in the Availity alliance. On the sur­
face, it seemed as though only one relationship 
existed: the two initial owners. A closer look re­
vealed several different relationships between 
BCBSF and Availity, ranging from BCBSF having 
an ownership interest in Availity, to BCBSF being 
the largest customer of Availity, to BCBSF being a 
vendor for Availity for technical development. Sim­
ilarly, Humana has multiple relationships with 
Availity. 
Many of the people involved in the formation 
had multiple accountabilities reflecting different 
aspects of the relationship. These multiple rela­
tionships and their corresponding accountabilities 
made it difficult to understand a person's perspec­
tive on a given issue. By mapping out the different 
relationships and corresponding accountabilities, 
ambiguity was reduced and problem-solving im­
proved. The exercise helped the parties under­
stand the various perspectives and clarified ac­
countabilities. Mapping out accountabilities in 
alliances is an approach that BCBSF is adopting 
which is starting to result in more favorable out­
comes in learning to separate people from prob­
lems. In addition, when individuals have several 
roles, the organization is learning the value of hav­
ing those individuals clearly communicate which 
role they are representing. 
Focus on Interests, Not Posi tions 
During initial discussions, Humana and BCBSF 
laid the groundwork to understand each other and 
see the situation from the other's perspective. Gen­
eral discussions about how each party viewed the 
industry, the future of healthcare, opportunities for 
collaboration, and anticipated future challenges 
helped both parties to identify and understand the 
other's interests regarding electronic connectivity. 
At later stages, for example, during the testing 
phase, this exercise served as a strong foundation 
in helping the parties to separate people from 
problems because there was an understanding of 
the other's viewpoints.  
One challenge in focusing on interests rather 
than positions had to do with the two organizations 
having different approaches to testing the various 
capabilities of Availity. One party was accus­
tomed to using a prescribed methodology for test­
ing the various capabilities. The other, being a 
new organization, had processes that were still 
under development. The "positions" had to do with 
which organization's testing procedures to follow, 
but the underlying interests for both part ies were 
identical: for Availity to be up and running error­
free. 
After holding a number of brainstorming ses­
sions, it became evident that the parties could 
combine components of their methodologies to cre­
ate a joint solution. By focusing on interests rather 
than positions, the parties realized that testing did 
not have to follow a certain methodology; it just 
had to result in error-free operations. By shifting 
the focus to interests rather than the positions, a 
new solution involving leveraging existing re­
sources in a more effective manner was designed. 
A joint testing approach was agreed upon to meet 
mutual interests, and the parties were able to 
learn from each other in creating the solution. 
Inventing Options for Mutual Gain 
Getting to Yes says, "Skill at inventing options can 
be one of your most useful assets." This was espe­
cially evident in the formation of Availity. Before 
Availity was conceived, Humana and BCBSF came 
together and identified their interests regarding 
electronic connectivity. Both parties wanted to im­
prove relationships with hospitals and physicians, 
reduce healthcare industry costs for consumers, 
and improve workflow for hospitals, physicians, 
and payers. The solution resulted in the joint ven­
ture that became Availity, which mutually bene­
fited both organizations. 
Getting to Yes says, "Skill at inventing 
options can be one of your most useful 
assets. " 
To assure that options for mutual gain were be­
ing sought throughout the development of Availity, 
relationship manager responsibilities were as­
signed to individuals to keep the best interests of 
the alliance in the forefront . Each party had some­
one who functioned in this capacity, which helped 
with the overall success of the alliance. Relation­
ship manager roles are now included in many of 
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BCBSF's alliances to serve as objective arbitrators 
between the parties and to look for options for 
mutual gain. 
Additional Lessons Learned 
BCBSF has learned a number of lessons about how 
to develop collaborative and productive alliance 
relationships. 
In general, the company's experience has been 
that applying the concepts from Getting to Yes 
came more naturally at the executive/strategic 
level and required much more deliberation at sub­
sequent levels. When alliance parties moved away 
from the conceptual level and into daily opera­
tions, implementing Getting to Yes concepts be­
came more challenging. There are several reasons 
for this, including the experience levels of those 
involved, challenges with establishing strategic 
alignment throughout all levels, and varying re­
ward systems at different levels of the organiza­
tion. Among the steps that BCBSF is taking to ad­
dress these challenges are: establishing alliance 
specialists at the middle-management level, and 
providing training regarding principled negotia­
tion concepts at all levels of the organization. 
Applying the concepts from Getting to 
Yes came more naturally at the 
executive/strategic level and required 
much more deliberation at subsequent 
levels. 
Many of the lessons learned involve setting clear 
expectations in the beginning of the alliance for­
mation. One is the importance of being deliberate 
in establishing ground rules for interacting with 
others early in the relationship before negotiation 
begins. Agreed-upon methods for communicating, 
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making decisions, and handling conflicts, al­
though somewhat awkward to create,  are critical 
in relationship building and can help the parties to 
separate people from problems,  especially when 
conflicts arise and emotions are high. 
Along the same lines, a documented business 
plan that defines the market opportunity, product 
or service, sales and promotion approach, and val­
idates financial forecasts can prove beneficial. 
The business plan is not only an effective tool for 
guiding the alliance; it also clarifies the interests 
and expectations of the parties. 
In addition to a business plan, the alliance par­
ties have found benefits in clearly defined strate­
gies with support ing organizational goals. In ad­
dition, the company is establishing metrics that 
measure not only the business results of alliances 
but the quality and strength of the relationships as 
well. 
Establishing early on what each party will con­
tribute in terms of capital,  resources, and revenue 
is also a lesson that the company has learned in 
forming successful alliances. Without this founda­
tion, the parties may have differing viewpoints of 
what the other is contributing, which often leads to 
misunderstanding and can prevent the alliance 
from progressing smoothly. 
Perhaps the biggest reward for implementing 
the concepts from Getting to Yes is being able to 
see first hand the benefits-meeting business 
goals, spending less time defending positions, cre­
ating a less stressful business environment , and 
meeting the underlying interests of both parties. 
The concepts have helped the company discover 
new ways of doing business- opening a new 
world of possibilities never imagined before. 
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